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Access control is a key function of enterprises that preserve and propagate massive data. Access 
control enforcement and administration are two major components of the system. On one hand, 
enterprises are responsible for data security; thus, consistent and reliable access control enforcement 
is necessary although the data may be distributed. On the other hand, data often belongs to several 
organizational units with various access control policies and many users; therefore, decentralized 
administration is needed to accommodate diverse access control needs and to avoid the central 
bottleneck. Yet, the required degree of decentralization varies within different organizations: some 
organizations may require a powerful administrator in the system; whereas, some others may prefer a 
self-governing setting in which no central administrator exists, but users fully manage their own data. 
Hence, a single system with adjustable decentralization will be useful for supporting various 
(de)centralized models within the spectrum of access control administration. 
Giving individual users the ability to delegate or grant privileges is a means of decentralizing 
access control administration. Revocation of arbitrary privileges is a means of retaining control over 
data. To provide flexible administration, the ability to delegate a specific privilege and the ability to 
revoke it should be held independently of each other and independently of the privilege itself. 
Moreover, supporting arbitrary user and data hierarchies, fine-grained access control, and protection 
of both data (end objects) and metadata (access control data) with a single uniform model will 
provide the most widely deployable access control system.  
Conflict resolution is a major aspect of access control administration in systems. Resolving access 
conflicts when deriving effective privileges from explicit ones is a challenging problem in the 
presence of both positive and negative privileges, sophisticated data hierarchies, and diversity of 
conflict resolution strategies.  
This thesis presents a uniform access control administration model with adjustable decentralization, 
to protect both data and metadata. There are several contributions in this work. First, we present a 
novel mechanism to constrain access control administration for each object type at object creation 
time, as a means of adjusting the degree of decentralization for the object when the system is 
configured. Second, by controlling the access control metadata with the same mechanism that 
controls the users’ data, privileges can be granted and revoked to the extent that these actions conform 
to the corporation’s access control policy. Thus, this model supports a whole spectrum of access 
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control administration, in which each model is characterized as a network of access control states, 
similar to a finite state automaton. The model depends on a hierarchy of access banks of 
authorizations which is supported by a formal semantics. Within this framework, we also introduce 
the self-governance property in the context of access control, and show how the model facilitates it. 
In particular, using this model, we introduce a conflict-free and decentralized access control 
administration model in which all users are able to retain complete control over their own data while 
they are also able to delegate any subset of their privileges to other users or user groups. We also 
introduce two measures to compare any two access control models in terms of the degrees of 
decentralization and interpretation. Finally, as the conflict resolution component of access control 
models, we incorporate a unified algorithm to resolve access conflicts by simultaneously supporting 
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The fast development of web applications and information sharing, together with the complex base of 
sensitive data in many practical systems, poses new challenges for access control administration. 
Decentralization of access control administration is the problem of our interest in this thesis. The 
problem is particularly difficult because administration models vary in their degree of 
decentralization.  
In practice, there are certain applications, such as in the military, that require a central access 
control administration. Yet, there are various environments, such as file-sharing systems, in which a 
sole centralized administration is not practical. No single existing model supports this variety 
simultaneously. Most current models provide a centralized administration only. A few recent models 
support decentralized administration to a limited extent. However, from a system developer 
perspective, an access control system usually needs to be installed in various organizations with 
diverse levels of decentralization. Moreover, in a single application, some objects need to be 
administered centrally whereas other objects demand a decentralized control. Appropriate adjustment 
of the degree of decentralization has a strong influence on efficiency and self-governance.  
Efficiency. There are several factors that affect efficiency of access control administration: the 
volume of data (i.e., end objects) and metadata (e.g., access control data), and consequently the 
number of administrative requests (at each moment) are so large in such systems that the central 
administration overhead becomes a bottleneck and efficiency becomes problematic. Centralized 
administration also imposes longer routings on requests being launched from distributed clients. This 
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is more critical in urgent situations: sensitive objects should be secure all the time yet quickly 
possible to be accessible to authorized subjects; for example, authorized personal health records 
should simply be accessible to emergency centers when needed. Yet, administering the access control 
must be reasonably fast even in non-emergency cases. Furthermore, in applications where data are 
naturally distributed, centralized administration is often incompatible. For instance, a specialist may 
need to access several health objects of a visiting patient, possibly filed in different health centers. 
(Similarly, decentralized administration may become difficult in applications in which accountability 
is centralized.) On the other hand, access control must be provided for the access control specification 
(called metadata in this thesis) itself; e.g., patients may query who can access their health records. 
Often systems restrict updating this metadata to a small group of access control administrators (called 
security officers in some systems), and for systems relying on so-called “discretionary access 
control”, it is important to diversify the population who may update metadata. It is also important that 
access control models provide a single uniform mechanism for administering both data and metadata. 
Example I in Section 1.3 illustrates the efficiency problem of very large access control systems, in 
which typically hundreds of thousands of objects exist.  
Self-governance. Self-governance is an important requirement of many information sharing 
systems: users in such situations wish to share their data without appealing to administrators; in many 
environments they should be allowed all operations on particular data (e.g. on their own data or on 
data for which they are responsible), including delegating privileges to others and revoking them at 
will; for instance, in healthcare systems, patients often and temporarily have to reveal their personal 
data to particular appropriate parties, such as physicians, hospitals, and laboratories. Therefore, 
applications in which several parties need to share data will be simpler to manage if each party fully 
controls its own (or responsible) data, subject to conformance with the underlying administrative 
policy formulated by the enterprise. (Note: ownership has been interpreted differently in the literature; 
in this work, “data owner” is a subject who is responsible for the data.) Moreover, objects are usually 
managed in different contexts that need to be administered differently. Even if different parties use 
the same underlying technology, they may require different sections of a complex access control 
policy to be enforced, which would be an error-prone burden for a centralized administration. 
Example II in Section 1.3 illustrates the self-governance property of access control models.  
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In conclusion, sharing data, including selectively delegating and revoking administrative privileges 
on the associated metadata, may be supported more reliably and more efficiently by a flexible 
decentralized access control administration. The challenge is to ensure that the underlying 
administrative policies are enforced. 
1.1 Access Control Components 
Before proceeding further, it is important to distinguish major components of access control systems, 
requests, policy, enforcement, and administration, depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Access control framework. 
– The set of objects under access control includes the set of subjects and the access control data 
itself (the metadata). 
– There are two types of access control requests: lookup and update. A lookup request is an 
attempt to retrieve some information from the data or metadata such as whether a given 
subject (user, application, or group) has privilege to modify a given object (data, application, 
metadata, etc.). An update request (depicted by dashed lines) is an attempt to change 
metadata. (Note that we are distinguishing here between lookup and update of the metadata 
itself, not of the end objects for which access is being controlled.) The direction of arrows 
indicates that when a given subject requests a lookup or an update, the enforcer decides if the 
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request is valid based on the current state of the metadata, and enforces the request 
appropriately. 
– Access control policy is a set of rules that all users in the system must follow; it defines the 
space of valid metadata states.  
– Access control enforcement is the mechanism of securing the system against invalid requests, 
that is, those that are not consistent with access control policy. Because data is one of the 
critical resources owned by an enterprise, data management systems must enforce access 
control policies developed by the enterprise administrators. Thus, each operation on each 
piece of data must be vetted by the system to determine whether the subject attempting the 
operation has appropriate privileges with respect to that item of data.  
– Access control administration is the mechanism of handling requests for access control 
updates. Any subject that can update the metadata is called a controller in our model.    
Note that this thesis focuses on decentralizing access control administration. Access control has to 
be consistently enforced (although perhaps distributed access machines and organizational units), but 
the administration of access control can often be handled without referring to central administrators. 
Figure 1 depicts the centralization of access control enforcement and the decentralization of access 
control administration.  
1.2 General Terminology 
This section reviews some basic access control terminology that is used in this thesis. In particular, 
one should distinguish between subject vs. object, delegate vs. grant, decentralized vs. centralized 
administration, explicit vs. effective privileges, and schema-level vs. instance-level control. 
Subject vs. object: Throughout this work, there are two general terms, subject and object, 
generalizing the notions of users and data, respectively. Objects, with respect to access control 
systems, are what are operated on and thus for which particular access is sought. Examples of objects 
are data, resources, and applications. Subjects, which have sometimes been defined as active objects, 
are those that (implicitly) request access in order to execute an operation. Examples of subjects are 
users, applications, and groups. It is important to recognize that the stored information representing a 
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subject is, in fact, data, and we treat a subject as an object for some operations. For formal definitions 
of subject and object, see Section 3.1. 
Delegate vs. grant: Some researchers distinguish between two related terms: grant and delegate. The 
former often refers to giving a privilege to a subject permanently, while the latter usually means  
giving a privilege to a subject temporarily. Similarly, other systems support “revocable” grants by 
providing a separate revoke operation. It is obvious that a temporary delegation is equally expressive 
to a permanent grant together with revoke. Hence, throughout this thesis, both terms are used 
interchangeably to assign a privilege, and we include an explicit revoke operation to remove it. 
Decentralized vs. centralized administration: The question is to what extent decentralization can be 
realized? It is important to recognize the spectrum of access control administration. At one end, 
access control can be absolutely autocratic: a powerful administrator exists in the system dictating 
which subjects have access to which objects; at the other end, it can be completely self-governing, 
which means that no central administrator exists in the system, but users fully manage their own data. 
Chapter 7 specifies such a model.  
Whereas security-conscious enterprises often use central enforcement mechanisms to support their 
access control policies, closely held access control administration may or may not fit their security 
requirements. In conclusion, access control venders desire to sell their product to various 
organizations requiring a diverse amount of decentralization. There are applications in which different 
object types require to be treated differently, centralized or decentralized. Such issues are addressed 
within Chapters 4 to 6.  
Explicit vs. effective privileges: Not every subject-object pair has explicit privileges assigned. 
Instead, access to objects with no explicit privileges can often be deduced from the set of other 
explicit privileges. For instance, in a hierarchical structure, access privileges are typically derived 
from the parent-child relationship: members of a group inherit all the privileges of the group and sub-
objects inherit the privileges of the objects in which they are contained. If no privilege or several 
conflicting privileges can be derived for a given subject-object pair, the access control system should 
resolve a final privilege for that pair. The ultimate explicitly or implicitly assigned privilege will be 












Access control data (called metadata) −which corresponds to relations of subjects, objects, and 
privileges− can be conceptually viewed as being represented by an access control matrix, where the 
rows represent subjects, the columns represent objects, and privileges are stored at the intersections 
[Lampson 1971]. The term effective matrix, is used to represent effective privileges as a three-
dimensional Boolean matrix EM, indexed by subject, object, and method. In such a matrix, no cell is 
null. The value of EM[s,m,o] is 1 if the corresponding subject s is privileged to execute method m on 
object o; otherwise EM[s,m,o] is 0. Correspondingly, an explicit matrix implements the idea of 
condensing the effective matrix by storing explicit privileges only. The explicit matrix can be 
expanded to the effective one by using propagation and conflict resolution strategies. Figure 2(a) 
depicts the transitions of access control policies to the explicit matrix and then to the effective matrix.  
Figure 2(b) illustrates, as an example, that the explicit matrix is represented by predicates permit and 
deny, and the effective matrix is represented by predicates allow and disallow in our access control 







(a) Abstract model. (b) ACAD predicates. 
Figure 2. Constructing an effective access control matrix from policies. 
Schema-level vs. instance-level control: Although access control is inherently a concern at the 
instance level (i.e., individual objects are subject to control), policies are more generally defined at 
the schema level. This approach simplifies administration, since it provides a convenient means to 




For the sake of generality, this thesis assumes an object-oriented data model, in which the type of 
an object dictates the set of applicable methods that can be applied to it. It is also assumed that 
privilege to execute each method is controlled independently: thus the ability to execute the read 
method requires read privilege, the ability to execute the write method requires write privilege, the 
ability to execute the append method requires append privilege, the ability to execute the delete 
method requires delete privilege, the ability to execute the “check into the hospital” method requires 
“check into the hospital” privilege, and so forth.  
1.3 Motivating Examples 
This section provides two motivating examples. One is a very large healthcare system that is used in 
order to highlight the efficiency importance of access control models. The other is an ad hoc scenario 
of document sharing environments that will help to highlight the self-governance property of such 
models.  
1.3.1 Healthcare Systems 
Example I. Assume a worldwide healthcare system in which there are hundreds of thousands of end 
objects (such as medical records, personal information, account balances, etc.) and users (such as 
patients, doctors, technicians, hospitals, etc.). There may be a huge number of access control requests 
at any moment. Some instances are: 
– Patients may wish to authorize other users, e.g. doctors and insurance agents, to read their 
personal information. 
– Some users, e.g., pharmacists, technicians, and patients as well as their family members, may 
request to see some or all parts of a medical record. 
– Some users, e.g. doctors and insurance agents, may request authorization for reading a 
particular patient’s medical history. 
– Patients may no longer wish their medical record to be seen by a particular family member. 
In such systems, a centralized administration may easily be overwhelmed with too many requests; 
on the other hand, information accessibility is often vital to such users so the requests should not be 
backlogged. As an improvement, a significant subset of requests can be handled by different users 
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without referring to administrators. In Chapter 7, we explain the User Managed Access Control 
(UMAC) specification in which the bottleneck of inefficiency is resolved by applying decentralized 
administration. Once the appropriate corporate policy is set up at configuration time, users can 
manage and share their data properly at run time. 
1.3.2 Document Servers 
Example II. Assume a web-based document server within which several users and groups (possibly 
competitors) share their documents. Each group may have some private documents that are accessible 
to its organization only, as well as other documents that may be shared with a subset of other users. 
Once the user’s corporate policy is in place, users are allowed to share their data with others so far as 
they wish and so long as they stay within the policy’s guidelines. Moreover, each user may stop 
sharing information at any point. There is no administrator in the system, and document accessibility 
is fully managed by users. As a simple instance of such a server, assume user A owns document P. 
Consider the following requests: 
– A authorizes B to delegate read privilege on P to other users. 
– B authorizes many others, including user C, to read P. 
– A decides to stop C, but not others, from reading P. 
Neither A nor B wishes to consult an administrator as long as their requests are within the corporate 
policy; instead, they wish to govern their own documents independently. Chapter 7 describes how 
users can manage their own data independently, in the absence of administrators of any kind, and 
without interfering with one another’s decisions with respect to their own data.  
Examples I and II, explained above,  emphasize the importance of efficiency and self-governance of 
access control administration. On one hand, a decentralized access control administration is required 
when several parties, usually without administrative control over one another, need to share their data. 
Such a model reduces the bottleneck of access administration in situations where data is distributed 
among various parties. On the other hand, the question is to what extent decentralization can be 
realized? The main contribution of this thesis is to provide an access control administration model in 
 
 9 
which the degree of decentralization for the whole system, as well as for each object type, can be 
adjusted at the configuration time. 
1.4 The Thesis Scope 
This thesis addresses the problem of access control administration. Assumptions are that the user’s 
authentication is successfully verified, the corporate policy is appropriate, and access control is 
correctly enforced by a reference monitor; these aspects are not addressed in the thesis. 
 There are several contributions in this work. First, an access control administration model (called 
ACAD), in which the degree of decentralization is adjustable from a centralized level to a very 
decentralized extent, is proposed. The model includes a novel configuration mechanism to constrain 
access control administration for each object type at object creation time, as the means of adjusting 
the degree of decentralization when the system is being installed. ACAD introduces the spectrum of 
access control administration as well as representing the administration as a network of access control 
states, similar to a finite state automaton. Each state is a directed acyclic graph in which access banks 
of authorizations and authorization inheritance relations map into the nodes and edges, respectively. 
Furthermore, a User Managed Access Control (UMAC) system, which supports wide-ranging access 
control features, is designed as an ACAD application. UMAC is a decentralized, conflict-free, and 
administrator-free model by which all subjects are able to manage their objects by delegating any 
fine-grained subset of their responsibilities to others yet retaining control to revoke privileges as 
desired. Moreover, UMAC’s delegation and revocation mechanism is distinguished by the following 
features: the privilege to delegate a privilege can be held independently of holding the privilege itself, 
the privilege to revoke a privilege can be held independently of the privilege to delegate it, and any 
privilege can be revoked from any grantee along the delegation path without affecting other grantees. 
This introduces the concept of self-governance in the context of access control. The thesis also 
incorporates a widespread framework to resolve access conflicts of environments that require both 
positive and negative privileges. The thesis validates ACAD by providing guidelines of policy 
specification, to guarantee the termination of policy reasoning and the well-definedness of effective 
privileges. Finally, we introduce two measures to highlight ACAD with respect to other significant 
models .  
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The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature of access control. 
Chapter 3 discusses hybrid models and provides a framework to resolve conflicts by supporting 48 
strategies simultaneously.  Chapter 4 establishes the ACAD specifications. Chapter 5 introduces 
creation time policies as a means of constraining access control administration. Chapter 6 describes 
the formal semantics of the model defined operationally by a relational model. Chapter 7 proposes 
user-managed access control.  Chapter 8 justifies features of ACAD in a comparison with several 





Researchers have investigated a variety of issues concerning the access control. This chapter clusters 
these issues in six categories, namely access control model, access control administration, role-based 
access control, decentralized access control, access control granularity, and miscellaneous related 
topics. Other work that strongly influences parts of the thesis will be cited closer to the points where 
they are related. 
2.1 Access Control Model 
An access control model is conceptually viewed as maintaining an access control matrix [Lampson 
1971], which was first introduced for operating systems. However, since an access control matrix in 
practice is often very large and sparse, storage refinements are required. A major approach is to 
implement the access control matrix implicitly by rules. As examples of rule-based access control, 
Graham-Denning and Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman are two similar enhanced models in which protection 
rules have been proposed [Graham and Denning 1972, Harrison et al. 1976]. Although the latter has a 
broad expressive power, both models have storage inefficiency. The Take-Grant model [Jones et al. 
1976] based on directed graphs is another improved version of the matrix model. This model provides 
a compact way of representing the access control data as well as supporting the transferring of rights. 
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2.2 Access Control Administration 
Access control administration is responsible for handling update requests on metadata (metadata 
refers to access control data). Mandatory Access Control (MAC) models are an example of fully 
centralized administration [Bell and Lapadula 1976], in which a subject may access classified objects 
in accordance with the subject’s clearance. The only form of delegation or revocation, then, is to 
reclassify a subject or an object. MAC has no flexibility, and it is not applicable when subjects or 
objects may not be classified within a limited number of groups. On the other hand, Discretionary 
Access Control (DAC) models are more flexible, and the administration model may be centralized or 
decentralized. For example, Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is a mechanism that typically 
provides central administration [Sandhu 1993] by defining roles. Although RBAC can be used to 
model arbitrary DAC systems, the decision of which subjects and objects are to be assigned to which 
roles is centrally controlled. The next section reviews RBAC models and several supporting 
extensions.  
2.3 Role-Based Access Control 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) models [Ferraiolo et al. 2001] provide a mechanism in which 
roles usually reflect job titles. However, in traditional role-based models, roles form a hierarchical 
relationship for the sake of efficiency [Ferraiolo et al. 2001]. For example, a project manager has his 
special privileges as well as all privileges of the project developers reporting to him. Thus, privileges 
are propagated through the role hierarchy. Since the first publication of the RBAC model [Ferraiolo et 
al. 1992], many researchers have investigated various aspects of RBAC, such as exploring properties 
of the roles hierarchy [Al-Kahtani and Sandhu 2003; Ferraiolo et al. 2003; Jansen 1998] and 
separation of duties [Botha and Eloff 2001; Joshi et al. 2003; Kuhn 1997]. Wang and Osborn recently 
proposed to exploit the group hierarchy for user to user and role to role delegations to overcome the 
shortcomings of RBAC-based delegation models, which suffer from needing to modify the role 
hierarchy in a very complex structure [Wang and Osborn 2003; Wang and Osborn 2006]. Also, Joshi 
and Bertino assume the presence of more than one hierarchy among the subjects, and discuss the 
simplest delegation (with no further delegation) and revocation (no cascade)  mechanisms in their 
work [Joshi and Bertino 2006]. Furthermore, some enhancements have been proposed to the RBAC 
model for distributed environments [Park and Hwang 2003; Wedde and Lischka 2003].  
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There have been several restrictions on the use of RBAC in practice. First, it is not normally 
suggested for applications in which a natural role hierarchy does not exist. Second, delegation and 
revocation are not sufficiently discussed in the RBAC literature; moreover, the proposals are mostly 
impacted by the centralized role control of RBAC. Scalability to hundreds of thousands of subjects 
and millions of objects is also a problem due to the model’s central administration. The considerable 
work on administrative and temporal RBAC models is separately reviewed in the following 
subsections.  
2.3.1 Administrative RBAC 
There are several endeavours to decentralize the role administration of RBAC [Sandhu et al. 1999; 
Sandhu and Munawer 1999; Oh and Sandhu 2002; Kern et al. 2003; Oh et al. 2006]. Nevertheless, 
none of these models results in a pure decentralized administration.  The difficulty is that RBAC has 
been designed to simulate organizational authorizations, assuming that role hierarchies are essentially 
centralized and mostly static. This assumption is an innate impediment to developing a successful 
decentralized RBAC model. Therefore, all these works present similar concepts and rely on the 
organizational hierarchies exploited by RBAC. In particular, Kern et al. address several shortcomings 
of ARBAC97 [Sandhu et al. 1999], ARBAC99 [Sandhu and Munawer 1999], and ARBAC02 [Oh and 
Sandhu 2002; Oh et al. 2006], in which the notion of administrative roles, mobile and immobile role 
memberships, and the concept of independence of an organisational unit and role hierarchies, 
respectively, have been introduced. Kern et al. introduce the concept of scopes in their model 
(ERBAC) to describe the objects over which an administrator has authority. Scopes are principally 
similar to the concept of domains in ARBAC02; however, scopes are defined as an abstract concept 
and do not have to mirror an organizational structure. Yet, ERBAC does not address delegation and 
revocation. Delegation and revocation in ARBAC97, ARBAC99, and ARBAC02 are restricted to 
existing roles, which limits their flexibility. Moreover, there is no mechanism provided to expand (or 
decrease) the administrative scopes: scopes themselves are administered centrally. Crampton and 
Loizou formally define the scoped administration of role-based access control model (SARBAC) 
using a graph formalism. SARBAC overcomes several shortcomings of ARBAC models. Intuitively, 
the authors propose several types of updates for the role hierarchy; yet, their model does not address 
how the scopes can be updated [Crampton 2002; Crampton and Loizou 2003].  
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Using the logic introduced by Jajodia et al. [Jajodia et al. 2001], Wang et al. propose an attribute-
based access control in which they allow hierarchical structuring on any attribute [Wang et al. 2004]. 
The logic is technically suitable but has no industrial support.  
Rosenthal and Sciore propose a collaborative administration model in which they present policies 
as conjunctions of factors [Rosenthal and Sciore 2004]. Therefore, when a circumstance changes, 
only the relevant factor(s) need to be revised instead of the whole policy. 
2.3.2 Temporal RBAC 
Bertino et al. propose a temporal role-based model (TRBAC) to support temporal constraints for role 
enabling, which is important in time-sensitive applications [Bertino et al. 2001c]. The TRBAC model 
was generalized, forming GTRBAC, to provide several language constructs to support temporal 
constraints for role enabling, role activation, role assignments, etc. [Joshi et al. 2001; Joshi et al. 
2005]. The authors also address the problem of incompatibility between role hierarchies and temporal 
constraints [Joshi et al. 2002a, Joshi et al. 2002b]. Moreover, Bhatti et al. propose an XML-based 
specification of GTRBAC, so called X-GTRBAC [Bhatti et al. 2005a]. The original X-GTRBAC 
model has no administrative features. Hence, the authors subsequently define a nice administrative 
model [Bhatti et al. 2004, Bhatti et al. 2005b], which is decentralized in the sense that there is a 
partially ordered administrative domain hierarchy, and each domain is independently administered by 
its own team of administrators. The administrative domains map the functional units, and the highest 
role in each functional hierarchy is called the administrative role. They also propose a policy 
integration mechanism to resolve possible conflicts existing between domains. The X-GTRBAC 
administrative model suffers from lack of scalability due to the following reasons: first, since the 
model is based on the RBAC framework, modifying the role hierarchy is complex; also, modifying 
administrative domains has not been envisioned in X-GTRBAC; in fact, there is an assumption in the 
model that the enterprise includes predefined domains which may not change dynamically; 
furthermore, X-GTRBAC specification imposes capability-list implementation (for the distribution of 
the abstract access control matrix) and identity-based authentication which affect the applicability of 
the model in arbitrary large enterprises.  It is desirable to support unknown users (as opposed to 
capabilities and identity-based mechanisms) characterized by certain properties, such as a user’s 




The concept of delegation and revocation has been used as a means of decentralization of 
administration. Decentralized access control mechanisms were first proposed for System R to permit 
users to share and control their data in multi-user databases systems [Griffith and Wade 1976]. 
System R introduced its grant and revoke commands for decentralized administration. The System R 
model was later extended to support negative authorizations and more expressive revocation 
algorithms for relational data management systems [Bertino et al. 1999]. Moffet used the concept of 
domains to specify administrative domains in distributed systems [Moffett 1990]. Ravichandran and 
Yoon propose to use delegation to distribute the workload among several grouped peer-to-peer 
communities [Ravichandran and Yoon 2006]. They do not provide a revocation mechanism in their 
model. Further, similar mechanisms for RBAC models were proposed [Barka and Sandhu 2000a; 
Barka and Sandhu 2000b; L. Zhang et al. 2002; L. Zhang et al. 2003; X. Zhang et al. 2003]. Barka 
and Sandhu proposed RBDM (Role-Based Delegation Models) in which the unit of delegation is 
“role”. They also discussed temporary delegation as well as grant-dependent and grant-independent 
revocations in their work. However, RBDM has not been formalized. L. Zhang et al. proposed 
RDM2000 (Role-based Delegation Model), which extended RBDM by providing multilevel 
delegations and formal definitions of delegation features. Later, X. Zhang et al. extended RDM and 
RBDM models by adding finer-grained delegation to their model, so called PBDM (Permission Based 
Delegation Model). The PBDM series do not support constraints in delegation, neither do they 
support decentralized applications. Recently, Ahn et al. proposed an access control model based on 
RBAC for a collaborative environment [Ahn et al. 2003; Tolone et al. 2005]. Their model exploits the 
powerful rule-based mechanism of RDM2000 to define constraints. However, it still lacks the ability 
for further delegation.   
In all of these models, the delegation and revocation mechanism is centrally controlled. There is no 
way of expanding administrative features by individual users and a central security officer (or team) 
controls the permission flow. Hence, administration becomes a bottleneck in applications where 




Access control granularity, in the context of a hierarchically organized database, refers to the extent to 
which different levels of access can be defined on objects or parts of objects. Fine-grained access 
control manages access authorizations on small pieces of objects. Many proposed models [Graham 
and Denning 1972; Harrison et al. 1976; Jones et al. 1976; Lampson et al. 1976] assume access 
control at the object level only and ignore any internal structure within objects. However, if objects 
entail a hierarchy, the distinction between objects and sub-objects becomes meaningful. Jones 
examined an object-level access control model for client-server object databases [Jones 1997]. He 
provided a fine-grained access control model, which supports navigating the data structure by inter-
object references. Zhang et al. introduced access control vectors and slabs for fine-grained access 
control based on a code-based scheme to represent a more compact structure for control data [Zhang 
et al. 2005]. 
2.6 Miscellany 
This section reviews various access control topics, including access control properties, policy 
analysis, and comparison of access control models.. 
To evaluate whether an access control instance conforms to an access control policy, one may 
check the mechanism’s properties such as safety, invulnerability, no-information-flow, and non-
interference [Bell and Lapadula 1976; Biba 1977; Focardi and Gorrieri 1997; Goguen and Meseguer 
1983; Jaeger and Tidswell 2001]. There are also considerable research works on policy analysis 
[Jajodia et al. 1997; Li et al. 2003; Bertino et al. 2001a; Bertino et al. 2001b; Jajodia et al. 2001; 
Bertino et al. 2003]. Policies are often analyzed by exploiting logical languages and some ad hoc 
rules and/or rule properties. Notably Li et al. propose a formal specification and semantics for  policy 
analysis in distributed environments.  
Comparison of access control models has also interested researchers. Tripunitara and Li propose a 
comparison mechanism based on simulation to compare two given access control models [Tripunitara 
and Li 2004]. The simulation is based on transition networks of access control models, and if model 
A can simulate all states of model B, A is said to be at least as expressive as B. Using this 
mechanism, the authors conclude that ARBAC97 [Sandhu et al. 1999] is limited in its expressivity, 
and also a trust management language [Chander et al. 2001] is at least as expressive as ARBAC97. 
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Jaeger et al. introduce an access control space in which authorizations are divided into five 
permission sets, namely permissible, specified, obligated, prohibited, and unknown [Jaeger et al. 
2003].  The permissible set consists of authorizations that are known and can be assigned to a given 
subject S.  The specified set consists of those permissible authorizations that have been assigned to a 
given subject S. The obligated set consists of authorizations that are required (for example by the 
system) to be assigned to a given subject S. The prohibited set consists of those authorizations that 
must not be assigned to a given subject S. The unknown set includes those subspaces on which 
neither permissible rules nor prohibited rules are defined. The authors believe that understanding 




DEDUCING EFFECTIVE ACCESS CONTROL 
An explicit access control matrix is typically large and sparse since, in practice, authorizations are 
explicitly defined only for a small proportion of subjects and objects; the rest of the matrix is null. 
Yet, since the effective access control matrix is required to be well-defined, which means every cell 
must have an effective authorization (no null or conflicting value is allowed), explicit authorizations 
are propagated throughout the subject and object hierarchies to obtain the effective authorizations.  
Conflicts may occur when authorizations are propagated throughout the hierarchies since a 
particular node may be simultaneously authorized by one of its ancestors for some activity and denied 
by another ancestor for that same activity. A conflict is also said to occur when the set of ancestors 
provides neither permission nor denial for some activity. 
This chapter addresses propagation of authorizations and resolution of conflicts. In particular, 
Section 3.1 introduces subjects and objects as well as the hierarchies among them. Section 3.2 
describes how conflicts may happen on a given hierarchy. Section 3.3 reviews major conflict 
resolution policies. Section 3.4 combines the policies to obtain 48 strategy instances. Section 3.5 
provides a logical formalism for the combined strategies. Section 3.6 describes a unified parametric 
algorithm to support all the instances. Section 3.7 demonstrates the experimental results. Section 3.8 
describes the propagation of authorization on hierarchies. Finally, Section 3.9 reviews the literature of 
conflict resolution models. 
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3.1 Subjects and Object Hierarchies  
Definition 1 (Access Control Universe). The access control universe U is the collection of all objects 
of any type in the system. (Object types are introduced in Section 4.3.) We assume a simple set 
language to describe members of the universe. In Figure 1, in Chapter 1, the set All-objects 
represents the access control universe. Throughout this thesis, sets are depicted with capital letter 
labels, and those members which are objects are depicted with labels composed of lower-case letters. 
Definition 2 (Subjects). The set of subjects Public ⊆ U, are the collection of all active objects that are 
able to launch access requests. Figure 1, in Chapter 1, depicts the subset as Subjects to represent all 
active objects. Throughout this thesis, the subject members are depicted with labels that start with a 
capital letter.  
Definition 3. (Owner). A set of subjects S ⊆ Public, who are responsible for a given object O∈ U, is 
called O’s owner. Deciding who is the owner of an object can be expressed by access control policies, 
which are explained in Section 5.1. 
Definition 4 (Permission). A permission p is the right to execute a specific method on a given object 
o∈U. Note that permissions in ACAD are not limited to a fixed set of rights such as read or write.  
Access control can be defined as a mechanism to dictate the permissions that particular sets of 
subjects, i.e., users and applications, are given to access particular sets of objects, i.e., data. 
Definition 5 (Subject Constraint). A constraint C is an expression that defines the domain of 
applicable subjects who may (or may not) be granted a permission p. We assume a simple set 
language to denote the applicable subset of Public.  
Definition 6 (Access Authorization). An access authorization a is a quadruple <C, mode, p, O> 
permitting (or denying) permission p on a non-empty set of objects O ⊆ U to be assigned to any 
subset of Public who satisfy constraint C; an authorization mode is either permit or deny, as described 
in detail in Section 3.8.  
The set of subjects and the set of objects both form hierarchies that can be represented as directed 
acyclic graphs. Following convention, outgoing edges from a group in the subject hierarchy lead to all 
members of that group (either subgroups or individual users), and outgoing edges from an object in 
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the object hierarchy lead to all its subobjects. It is important that the hierarchies not be restricted to 
form trees.  
The subject hierarchy when viewed bottom-up maps group membership: if (S1, S2) is an edge in the 
hierarchy, every member of S2 is also a member of S1. Note that an individual subject in our model is 
represented as a group with no child vertex. For example, in Figure 3(a), subjects Dorothy and Claude 
are individuals, whereas subjects Surgeons-team1, Doctors, Consultants, and Lawyers are groups. 
Dorothy is a direct member of Surgeon-team1, Doctors, and Consultants; Claude and Mary are direct 
members of Consultants only. Since subject Consultants is a member of subject Lawyers, subjects 
Dorothy, Mary, and Claude are members of Lawyers too. In general, a group can have zero or more 
subgroups and zero or more individual nodes; and, a member of a group enjoys all authorizations of 
that group.  
On the other hand, the object hierarchy is a collection of distinct top-down ownership hierarchies 
that each maps a has-a relationship between objects. In general, an object can have zero or more 
subobjects; and its assigned authorizations are propagated to all of its subobjects. An ownership 
hierarchy is a sub-graph of all objects owned by the same subject. Ownership hierarchies may be 
connected to one another through cross-references. For example, in Figure 3(b), object encounter 
includes two nested objects hospitalization_info and diagnosis_info as well as cross-referring 
(depicted by the dotted arrow) object balance that is owned by another subject. Permissions from 
higher objects (source vertices) in the object hierarchy are propagated to nested objects (destination 
vertices) within the same ownership only. For example, in Figure 3(b), permissions on encounter are 





(a) Subject hierarchy maps  
the group membership. 
 
  (b) Object hierarchy maps  
nested objects. 















3.2 Conflicts on Hierarchies 
Figure 4 illustrates a subject inheritance hierarchy including nine subjects. The arrows represent 
group membership (e.g., subjects S4 and S5 are members of subject/group S3) and the sign labels 
represent explicit authorizations (+ indicates positive authorization and – represents denial). For 
simplicity of exposition, we assume that access to an object is either granted or denied (rather than 
separately controlling reading, writing, and other operators), and we illustrate only authorizations for 
a single object. The figure shows that subjects S2 and S4 are explicitly labelled to access the object, 
whereas subject S5 is explicitly denied from accessing it.  
Given the data in Figure 4, assume we are interested in knowing whether or not subject User is 
authorized to access the object. One may interpret the data to mean that the object is accessible to 
subject User since User is a descendant of S2 and thereby inherits S2’s authorizations. However, 
another may argue that the object should not be accessible to User since he is a member of S5 which is 
denied access. In fact, there is a conflict in the system. Conflict resolution policies are needed to 
answer such questions. 
 
 
Figure 4. Conflicts on hierarchies. 
There exist several conflict resolution policies, such as “denial takes precedence” and “the most 
specific takes precedence,” in the literature of access control models. Yet, adopting one simple policy, 
such as “the most specific authorization takes precedence,” is not sufficient in practice. For instance, 
such a policy is insufficient where the subject hierarchy is more complex than tree-based structures 
and therefore, a subject may have more than one “most specific” authorization. For example, in 

















the minimum distance of 1 from User. Furthermore, there are situations in which the highest authority 
(not the most specific one) should be the final arbiter. For instance, assume a student is authorized by 
the university athletic office to referee hockey games on campus (which requires more than 20 hours 
per week for several weeks); however, he is required by the department not to accept heavy non-
departmental tasks (in order to comply with his full-time registration status). In such a case, the 
university administration may override the department by deciding to let him referee. To visualize 
such a case, assume there is an edge from S1 to S2 in Figure 4 and S1 is labelled positively. 
Representing the student by User, the referees group by S2, the members of the department by S5, and 
the university members by S1, it is apparent that for this enterprise the most global authorization 
should take precedence in resolving the conflict. 
Some have proposed the “negative takes precedence” policy, but this too is not universally 
acceptable. For instance, conflicts often are resolved by the “majority takes precedence” rule in 
voting systems. Additionally, the open policy recommends a default positive authorization for 
subjects which are not explicitly permitted to access a particular object [Harrison et al. 1976; 
Lampson 1971]. Therefore, there are applications in which “positive takes precedence”.  
Even from these simple examples we see that, in many systems, it is required to combine various 
conflict resolution policies to obtain a comprehensive conflict resolution strategy. Moreover, each 
policy may encompass several variants, and consequently many strategy instances are possible. If an 
access control system is to be deployed in a wide range of enterprise settings, many complete 
strategies must be supported. What are all the legitimate strategy instances? Is there a unified 
algorithm to support all instances parametrically? 
3.3 Conflict Resolution Policies 
Definition 7 (Explicit Access Control Matrix). The initial access matrix EACM, which includes 
explicit authorizations only is called explicit access control matrix; EACM is represented as a set of 
quadruples <subject,object,permission,value>, in which subject∈Public, object∈U, 
permission∈Permissions (cf. Definitions 1-3), and value is either 1 or 0 representing an explicit 
permission or denial, respectively. 
Definition 8 (Effective Matrix). The effective matrix EM is a well-defined three-dimensional Boolean 
matrix indexed by Public, U, and Permissions (cf. Definitions 1,2, and 4). The value of EM[i,j,k]for 
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all i∈Public, j∈U, and k∈Permissions is either 1 or 0 representing an effective permission or denial, 
respectively. 
Given an explicit matrix, conflict resolution strategies and propagation modes are used to fill in all 
derived authorizations to determine the effective matrix. Because the explicit matrix is typically very 
sparse, practical systems will store the explicit matrix (perhaps as capability lists [Dennis and Van 
1966] or access control lists [Saltzer 1974]) and compute access control authorizations as needed by 
executing an authorization propagation and conflict resolution algorithm on an appropriately 
extracted subset of that matrix. Conflict resolution is required when propagating authorizations results 
in no decision for a particular <subject, object, operation> triple or when both positive and negative 
authorizations can be derived for that triple. Commonly used conflict resolution policies are outlined 
as follows:  
Preference Policy. Preferred authorization (with one of two modes: either positive or negative) is 
determined by the system installer at configuration time. This policy determines which authorization 
wins when both positive and negative authorizations (or neither negative nor positive authorization) 
can be derived for a particular triple. Negative authorization is preferred (known as closed policy) in 
more restricted systems such as the military; positive authorization may be preferred in more open 
applications such as public information systems. 
Locality Policy. The common mode of this distance-based policy states that the most specific 
authorization takes precedence. It applies to distributed organizations whose local branches may 
recognize an exception to a general rule. For instance, a department in a university may admit an 
outstanding applicant although the general admission requirement is not completely met. Thus, for a 
given subject, when both positive and negative authorizations can be derived from different ancestors, 
the one that is closer to the subject wins. Note that the distance between two nodes (subjects) in a 
directed acyclic graph is measured by computing the shortest directed path. The locality policy is not 
deterministic since no authorization wins when the distances are equal.  
As an alternative for the locality policy, some enterprises might choose “globalization,” where the 
most general authorization takes precedence. One application of this policy is in distributed 
organizations whose headquarters makes the final decision on a pre-approved task by a local office. 
Similarly, a supreme court may override an appealed decision. For a given subject, when both 
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positive and negative authorizations can be derived from different ancestors, the one that is farther 
from the subject wins. Similar to the usual locality policy, the distance between two nodes is 
measured by computing the shortest path, and again this mode of locality is not deterministic since no 
authorization may win.  
Majority Policy. This policy states that the conflict can be resolved based on votes, and the 
authorization that has the majority wins. The application of this policy is in situations where several 
parties have different opinions for giving or not giving the authorization to a particular member and 
the decision is made by votes. For instance, GATT’s current members vote to determine if a new 
applicant can get into the group. By applying this policy, the dominant authorization takes 
precedence. This policy is also non-deterministic since it can result in a tie. 
Default Policy. This policy is applied only to root subjects or objects for which no authorization 
has been defined. Closed systems, such as in the military, require negative authorization by default; 
however, open systems, such as public information applications, initially allow any subject to enjoy a 
positive authorization. There are applications in which the default policy is not appropriate; for 
instance, one may wish to give priority to the explicit authorization. This policy is deterministic and 
has three modes (default positive, default negative, or ignore), but applies to root subjects only.  
Note that for non-root nodes, only the preference policy is deterministic. 
3.4 Combined Strategies 
Figure 5 illustrates five conflict resolution strategies based on combining, in different orders, the 
popular conflict resolution policies summarized above [Chinaei and Zhang 2006]. They are given the 
mnemonics DLP, DLMP, DP, DMLP, and DMP, in which D, L, M, and P indicate Default, Locality, 
Majority, and Preference policies, respectively. Two properties are guaranteed: first, none of the 
policies are redundant, and second, there is no conflict after applying the last step. Note that in this 
framework the Preference policy is always the last applicable policy, and the other three policies, 
Default, Locality and Majority, are optional. Moreover, the Default policy, if applicable, is the first 
policy since otherwise it is meaningless. Note that no other combined strategy can be meaningfully 
composed from these basic conflict resolution policies. For example, the preference policy cannot be 




Figure 5. Combined conflict resolution strategies. 
Because the default policy can take three modes and the locality and preference policies can take 
two modes each, there are 48 different strategy instances in total that can be derived from Figure 5 
[Chinaei et al. 2007]. (Paths ending with a, b, and d generate twelve instances each, and paths ending 




 (which means, 
first, apply the positive authorization as default, then apply the locality policy, and finally apply the 




 (which means, first, apply the negative 
authorization as default, then apply the globalization mode of locality, and finally apply the negative 
takes precedence if some conflict still exist), LP
+
 (which means, first, apply the locality policy, and 
then apply the negative takes precedence), etc. Moreover, the propagation mode can be either pass 
through, block by, or override, in which propagating authorization may pass through the explicit 
authorization, be blocked by it, or override it, respectively. For instance, assume Figure 4 does not 
include the edge S2User; therefore, to calculate permission for User, either S
+
2 can override S
-
5, or  
S
-




2 can pass through (but not override) S
-
5. Note that block by and override prioritize 
permissions along a single path, whereas locality and globalization prioritize permissions even in 
different paths. 
3.5 Logical Formalism  
This section provides guidelines for logically implementing the strategy instances explained in the 
previous section. Like the Authorization Specification Language [Jajodia et al. 2001], policies in 
ACAD are represented by logic programming rules. The ACAD model introduces four reserved 
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predicates named allow, disallow, permit, and deny. Whereas predicates allow and disallow are used 
to define the effective access control matrix as defined in Section 1.2 (allow representing 
EM[s,m,o]=1 and disallow representing EM[s,m,o]=0), predicates permit and deny are used to define 
an explicit access control matrix and to constrain the propagation of permissions. 
Examples:  
(a) Explicit permission is given to doctor Dana to read Patricia’s encounter and its sub-elements: 
permit(Dana, methodRead, patricia_encounter) 
(b) Robert cannot change consent form x: 
deny (Robert, methodChange, x) 
 (c) Effective permission is granted to patient Patricia to read her personal information:  
allow(Patricia, methodRead, patricia_personal_info) 
(d) Effective permission is denied to patient Patricia to delete her medical record: 
disallow(Patricia, methodDelete, patricia_medical_record) 
3.5.1 Propagation Policies 
To determine the values of all cells in the effective matrix, authorizations should be propagated 
within both hierarchies of subjects and objects in order to transform the explicit access control matrix 
to the corresponding effective matrix. This section selects a few strategy instances, introduced in 
Section 3.4, and provides the corresponding logical rules to transform an explicit access control 
matrix to an effective one.  First, we propagate all authorizations from the explicit access control 
matrix to an intermediate matrix which consists of two predicates maybe() and maybeNot(), 
regardless of the conflict resolution strategy is. These predicates have five variables, namely, S, M, O, 
D, and P, which represent the subject, authorization, object, the corresponding distance (which is later 
used for the locality rule), and set of propagation paths, respectively. 
Assume the propagation mode is “pass through”. The following rule, 
maybe(S,M,O,0,P)  permit(S, M,O), P={S}.    (1) 
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means that if there is an explicit authorization in the explicit access control matrix stating that subject 
S is permitted to execute method M on object O, a corresponding tuple is inserted into the 
intermediate matrix stating that the corresponding distance for the authorization is 0. Set P represents 
the propagation paths, which is represented by string S in this case. Moreover, the following rule, 
maybe(S,M,O,D,P)  maybe(X, M,O, D’,P’), child(S,X),  
D=D’+1, P=P’ || X.    (2) 
means that if subject S is a member of group X that is granted access to O from distance D’ and set of 
paths P’, all possible permissions of X are propagated to S with distance D’+1 and path P. (We use the 
notation P’ || X to mean that string X is concatenated to all paths in set P’.) Similarly, the following 
rule 
maybe(S,M,O,D,P)  maybe(S, M,X, D’, P’), child(O,X),  
D=D’+1, P=P’ || X.    (3) 
means that if subject S is granted access to object X from distance D’ and set of paths P’, its 
permission is extended with distance D’+1 to all sub-elements of X and path P.  
If the propagation mode is “block by”, rules (2) and (3) are replaced by the following rules: 
maybe(S,M,O,D,P)  maybe(X, M,O, D’,P’), child(S,X), ¬ deny(S, M, O),  
D=D’+1, P=P’ || X.    (4) 
and 
maybe(S,M,O,D,P)  maybe(S, M,X, D’,P’), child(O,X), ¬ deny(S, M, O),  
D=D’+1, P=P’ || X.    (5) 
respectively. 
Similar to rules 1-3, when the propagation mode is pass through, the following three rules, 
maybeNot(S,M,O,0,P)  deny(S, M,O), P={S}.    (6) 
maybeNot(S,M,O,D,P)  maybeNot(X, M,O, D’,P’), child(S,X),  
D=D’+1, P=P’ || X.    (7) 
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maybeNot(S,M,O,D,P)  maybeNot(S, M,X, D’,P’), child(O,X),  
D=D’+1, P=P’ || X.    (8) 
propagate all negative authorizations within both hierarchies of subjects and objects and insert them 
into the intermediate matrix.  
Now, recall that the effective matrix is constructed using predicates allow and disallow. The 
following rules 
disallow(S, M,O)  maybeNot(S,M,O,_,_),  ¬ maybe(S,M,O,_,_). (9) 
allow(S,M,O)  ¬ disallow(S,M,O).     (10) 
corresponds to the P
+
 strategy instance, where _ indicates a don’t-care term..  




 strategy instance, which means the default and preferred authorizations are 
negative and positive, respectively. The following rules together with rules (1) to (3) and (6) to (7) 
represent this policy: 
allow(S, M, O)  maybe(S, M, O, _,_).     (11) 
disallow(S, M, O)  ¬ allow(S, M, O).     (12) 
These rules state that as long as there is a corresponding positive authorization in the intermediate 
matrix, S is effectively allowed to execute M on O; and, once all positive authorizations are 
propagated and transformed, all non-filled cells of the effective access matrix are treated as denial of 
permission. 
To state the locality policy, we define two temporary predicates negativeCloser() and 
positiveCloser(), each of which has four variables, namely, S, M, O, and D, which represent the 
subject, authorization, object, and the corresponding distance, respectively; furthermore, we define 
two similar predicates negativeFurther() and positiveFurther() to state the globality rule: 
negativeCloser(S,M,O,c)  maybeNot(S,M,O,j,_), j<c.   (13) 
positiveCloser(S,M,O,c)  maybe(S,M,O,j,_), j<c.   (14) 
negativeFurther(S,M,O,c)  maybeNot(S,M,O,j,_), j>c.   (15) 







in which negative default, locality, and negative preference are indicated. If 
the propagation mode is again pass through, this can be represented by rules (1) to (3), (6) to (8), (12), 
(13), and the following rule, 
allow(S,M,O)  maybe(S,M,O,i,_), ¬ negativeCloser(S,M,O,i).  (17) 
To state the strategies in which the majority rule is in place, we define two other temporary 
predicates negativeBigger() and positiveBigger(). These predicates again have four variables, namely, 
S, M, O, and C, which represent the subject, authorization, object, and a counter, respectively: 
negativeBigger(S,M,O,c)  maybeNot(S,M,O,_,P), |P|>c.  (18) 
positiveBigger(S,M,O,c)  maybe(S,M,O,_,P), |P|>c.   (19) 
maybe(S,M,O,D,P)  maybe(S,M,O,D,P1),  
maybe(S,M,O,D’,P2), P = P1 U P2.  (20) 
maybeNot(S,M,O,D,P)  maybeNot(S,M,O,D,P1),  
maybeNot(S,M,O,D’,P2), P = P1 U P2.  (21) 
Each of rules (20) and (21) combines multiple paths into a single set, for positive and negative 
authorizations, respectively; the sets’ cardinality determine majority.  




 strategy instance, rules (1) to (3), (6) to (8), (12), and (18) to 
(21), as well as the following rule are applied: 
allow(S,M,O)  positiveBigger(S,M,O,c), ¬ negativeBigger(S,M,O,c). (22) 
 Finally, to keep the priority among majority and locality rules, we define another temporary 
predicate willAllow() which has three variables namely, S, M, and O, which represent the subject, 





one can apply rules (1) to (3), (6) to (8), (12), (14), and (18) to (21), as well as the following rules: 
disallow(S,M,O)  negativeBigger(S,M,O,i),  
¬ positiveBigger(S,M,O,i).    (23) 
willAllow(S,M,O)  positiveBigger(S,M,O,i),  
¬ negativeBigger(S,M,O,i).    (24) 
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disallow(S,M,O)  maybeNot(S,M,O,i,_),  
¬ positiveCloser(S,M,O,i), ¬ willAllow(S,M,O).  (25) 




, rules (23) to (25) should be replaced by the following rules:  
disallow(S,M,O)  maybeNot(S,M,O,i,_), ¬ positiveCloser(S,M,O,i). (26) 
willAllow(S,M,O)  maybe(S,M,O,i,_), ¬ negativeCloser(S,M,O,i).  (27) 
disallow(S,M,O)  negativeBigger(S,M,O,i),  
¬ positiveBigger(S,M,O,i), ¬ willAllow(S,M,O).  (28) 
One can formalize other strategy instances similarly.  
3.5.2 Propagation Policies Alternatives 
Propagation policies explained in Section 3.5.1 can be substituted with alternatives if required by the 
enterprise. For example,  
(a) Assume an enterprise does not wish to propagate authorizations through the object hierarchy, 
therefore only rules (1), (2), (6), and (7) are applied. (Rules (3) and (8) do not apply here.) 
(b) If the enterprise also does not require the permission propagation through the subject 
hierarchy, rules (2) and (7) should be removed as well.  
(c) If the enterprise requires an open policy in which authorizations are allowed unless otherwise 
explicitly denied, the following rules are applied:  
allow(S,M,O) ¬ deny (S,M,O,_,_). 
disallow(S, M, O)  ¬ allow(S, M, O). 
3.5.3 Policy Soundness 
Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 introduced the guidelines for logical implementation of conflict resolution 
strategies depicted in Figure 5. Notice that, rules (1) to (3) and (6) to (7) demonstrate the propagation 
phase when the mode is “pass through”, rules (4) and (5) illustrate how propagation rules can be 
enhanced to support other propagation modes, rules (10) and (12) guarantee the effective matrix is 
well-defined, and the rest of the rules provide guidelines for implementing various conflict resolution 
strategies introduced by Figure 5. In particular, rules (13) to (16) are applicable when the locality 
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Similarly, rules (18) and (19) are applicable when the majority policy is in place. Finally, rules (24) 
and (27) demonstrate how to handle the priority when both majority and locality policies are in place.  
By design, these rules are stratified which means none of the intensional predicates are in a 
negative recursive definition [Garcia-Molina et al. 2002]. Figure 6 illustrates the graph of intensional 




, one of the most sophisticated possible instances. 
This instance requires rules (1) to (3), (6) to (8), (12), (13), (18) to (21), and (26) to (28). Since there 
is not a cycle with a negative labelled arc in the graph, the set of rules are safe. In fact, the only 
restriction in the formalism is that rules (10) and (12) cannot be applied simultaneously. Moreover, 
since the default and preference policies are deterministic, our policy reasoning is sound, which 
means first it will eventually terminate and also be effective: if at least one of the rules (10) and (12) 
















Notice that these propagation and conflict resolution rules are independent of the rest of the access 
control model (in particular of the creation time policies specified in Chapter 5); these same rules 
define the corresponding effective matrix for any given explicit access control matrix following the 
particular conflict-resolution policy defined. Furthermore, if the effective matrix is not materialized 
maybeNot maybe 
negBigger posBigger posCloser 
willAllow 
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(that is, it is interpreted as a view over the explicit access control matrix), its content automatically 
reflects any changes made to the explicit access control matrix. 
3.6 Unified Algorithm 
This section describes an algorithm that propagates explicit authorizations through the subject  and 
object hierarchies, and resolves the possible conflicts based on any of the 48 strategy instances 
illustrated in Section 3.4. To determine whether a given object, oj, is effectively accessible to a given 
subject, Si, with respect to a given right, rk, the idea is to apply the following four-step procedure: 
Step 1: Consider the maximal sub-graph (called H1) of the subject hierarchy in which Si is the sole 
sink and all other nodes are its ancestors. Similarly, consider the maximal sub-graph (called H2) of the 
object hierarchy in which Oj is the sole sink and all other nodes are its ancestors. 
Step 2: Assign a letter “d” to all root subjects in H1 that are unlabeled with respect to right rk and 
ancestors of oj. Similarly, assign a letter “d” to all root objects in H2 that are unlabeled with respect to 
right rk and ancestors of Si. 
Figure 7 illustrates the result of Steps 1 and 2 for subject User, object obj, and right read, illustrated 
in Figure 4 as the example of conflicts on hierarchies. 
 
 
Figure 7. Sub-graph of subject User. 
Step 3: Propagate all authorization labels down every path to subject User and store the distance of 
each propagated authorization from its source node to its destination node (User). For instance, the 
distance of label - (on S5) to node User is 1; also, there are two distances for label “d” (on S6) to node 














Table 1 illustrates the result of authorization propagation in the “pass through” mode for subject 
User, object obj, and right read as represented by Figure 7. 
Step 4: Apply a particular conflict resolution strategy to resolve any conflicts and derive a final 
effective authorization for the triple <Si, oj, rk>.  
Table 2 illustrates the result of applying each of the 48 strategy instances (explained in Section 3.4) 
to Table 1.  
 
Table 1. All read authorizations of User on obj. 
subject  object  right  dis mode 
User obj  read 1 - 
User obj  read 1 d 
User obj  read 2 d 
User obj  read 1 + 
User obj  read 3 + 






 is the strategy instance in which first the default policy is applied and every 
root subject which is null is initialized to +; then, if there is a conflict, the Locality policy (“the most 
specific authorization takes precedence”) is applied; then if there is still a conflict, the Majority policy 
is applied; and finally, if the conflict is not resolved, the preference policy in which the positive (+) 
authorization takes precedence is applied. Let’s see what the result of this strategy instance is on 




all mode d’s are replaced by +; by applying the locality 
policy, the conflict is not resolved since there are conflicting modes + and - from the shortest distance 
1; however, by applying the majority rule, mode + wins over mode - since there are more + entries 
than - entries. Note that the preference policy is not applicable to this case since the conflict is 





Table 2. Resolved authorization for each combined strategy. 
strategy mode strategy mode strategy mode strategy mode 
D+LMP+ + D+LP+ + LMP+ + D+MLP+ + 
D+LMP- + D+LP- - LMP- - D+MLP- + 
D-LMP+ - D-LP+ + GMP+ + D-MLP+ - 
D-LMP- - D-LP- - GMP- + D-MLP- - 
D+GMP+ + D+GP+ + MP+ + D+MGP+ + 
D+GMP- + D+GP- + MP- + D+MGP- + 
D-GMP+ + D-GP+ + LP+ + D-MGP+ - 
D-GMP- - D-GP- - LP- - D-MGP- - 
D+MP+ + D+P+ + GP+ + MLP+ + 
D+MP- + D+P- - GP- + MLP- + 
D-MP+ - D-P+ + P+ + MGP
+ + 
D-MP- - D-P- - P- - MGP
- + 
 
For each strategy instance in Table 2, we use a bold font to show which policy has determined the 
effective authorization when applied to our example. For example, in the last strategy instance, MGP
-
, 
by applying the first policy (Majority), the positive authorization wins since there are two +’s (rows 4 
and 5) as opposed to only one - (row 1) in Table 1. Therefore, the localization and preference policies 
of the MGP
-
 instance are not applicable to this case.  
3.6.1 Algorithm Resolve() 
This section defines our conflict resolution algorithm. Figure 8 illustrates Algorithm Resolve() which 
computes the derived authorization mode of a given subject with respect to a given object and right. 
The algorithm parameters are s, o, r, dRule, lRule, mRule, and pRule; and the result is either + or -. 
Parameters s, o, and r designate a particular subject, object, and right, respectively, on which the 
caller is interested to know whether or not the object is accessible to the subject with respect to the 
specified right. Parameters dRule, lRule, mRule, and pRule determine the conflict resolution strategy, 
based on which the final right of the subject on the object must be derived. In particular, parameter 
dRule represents the default authorization policy and takes either of the three values “+”, “-“, or “0”, 
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which respectively states that the unlabelled root ancestors of the subject and object are to be 
initialized to positive authorization, negative authorization, or remain null (no default authorization 
policy). Parameter lRule represents the locality policy; its value is either min(), max(), or identity(), 
which represent “the most specific authorization takes precedence, ” “the most general authorization 
takes precedence, ” or “no locality policy” modes, respectively. Parameter mRule takes three values 
before, after, or skip, which determines whether the majority policy is applied before the locality 
policy, after it, or not at all, respectively. Finally, parameter pRule represents the preference policy 
and determines whether positive or negative authorization is preferred in the case of remaining 
conflicts. (We assume that the subject and objects hierarchies (SDAG and ODAG) and the explicit 
access control matrix (EACM) are globally defined in the algorithm.) 
In Line 1, relation allRights is created by calling Function Propagate(). The details of this function 
are explained in the next section, but the effect is to apply the first three steps of the procedure 
described in the introduction to Section 3.6.  
Line 2 checks whether the caller is interested in applying the default policy (dRule = “+” or “-“) or 
not (dRule = “0”). In the latter case, only those rows of relation allRights are considered in which 
mode <> “d” (see Line 3). In the former case (Line 4), those rows of relation allRights in which 
mode=“d” are updated with the value of dRule (“+” if positive authorization is to be the default 
policy, “-” otherwise). 
In Line 5, if the majority policy should be applied before the locality policy, we count the number 
of positive authorizations (Line 6) and negative authorizations (Line 7) that exist in relation allRights; 
however, as stated in Line 8, if the majority policy should be applied after the locality policy, we first 
apply the locality on relation allRights, and then count the number of positive (Line 9) and negative 
authorizations (Line 10). In either of these cases (Line 11), the algorithm returns the authorization 
which is in majority (Lines 12 and 13). 
If neither positive nor negative labels is in the majority or the majority policy is not designated at 
all, we apply the locality policy to relation allRights to select its relevant rows (Line 14); if lRule = 
min(), only rows in which the value of column dis is equal to the minimum distance (the most specific 
authorizations) are selected; similarly, if lRule = max(), only rows in which the value of column dis is 
equal to the maximum distance (the most general authorizations) are selected; however, if 




Figure 8. Algorithm Resolve(). 
Algorithm I: Resolve(s, o, r, pMode, dRule, lRule, mRule, pRule) 
¤  To compute the effective accessibility of subject s on object o w.r.t. right r 
¤  Propagation mode pMode ∈ {“pass through”, “block by”, “override”} 
¤  Default rule dRule ∈ {“+”, “-”, “0”} 
¤  Locality rule lRule ∈ {max(), min(), identity()} 
¤  Majority rule mRule ∈ {“before”, “after”, “skip”} 
¤  Preferred rule pRule ∈ {“+”, “-”} 
¤ The subject and object hierarchies (SDAG and ODAG), and the explicit access control 
matrix (EACM) are globally defined. 
Output: either “+” or “-” 
1.  allRights ←  Propagate (s, o, r, pMode, SDAG, ODAG, EACM); 
2.  if dRule = “0” 
3. allRights ← allRights
mode "d"<>
σ  
4.  else update allRights set mode=dRule  
where mode=“d”; 
5.  if mRule = “before” 




















8.  if mRule = “after” 








































11. if mRule <> “skip” 
12.  if c1 > c2 return “+”; 
13.  if c2  > c1 return “-”; 











15. if count(distinct Auth) = 1 
16.  return Auth; 
17. return pRule; 
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Next, the values of column mode of corresponding rows are projected to form a set called Auth, 
which may be empty or contain positive and negative authorizations. If only one type of authorization 
is present (Line 15), it is returned (Line 16); otherwise, the preferred authorization (pRule) is returned 
and the algorithm ends. 
Table 3. Trace of Resolve(). 

























 n/a n/a + + 8 
GMP
-
 1 0 n/a + 6 
P
-
 n/a n/a -,+ - 9 
MGP
-
 1 0 n/a + 6 
 
Table 3 illustrates the result of Algorithm Resolve() applied to our motivating example for several 
illustrative strategies. In particular, we trace the algorithm for eight strategy instances (selected from 


























. Table 3 shows 
values of c1, c2, Auth, and the effective mode derived by the algorithm, as well as its corresponding 
return line number. In the table, n/a means that the algorithm does not use the corresponding variable 
for the conflict resolution. 




, all default values of relation allRights 
are replaced with “-” (Line 3). Since the global mode of the locality policy is in place and there are 
one positive and one negative authorization from distance 3 in Table 1, both c1 and c2’s values are 
assigned the value 1 (Lines 5). Then, since neither positive nor negative is in majority, the algorithm 
continues to Line 7, and Auth is assigned the value {+,-}. Finally, since there is a conflict in Auth, 
Line 9 of the algorithm returns the value of preference policy, which is “-” (indicated by P
-
 in the 
strategy instance), as the final derived decision with respect to triple <User, obj, read>.  
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As another example, if one chooses strategy instance MGP
-
, in Line 2, only those rows of relation 
allRights in which the mode is not “d” are selected. Then, since the globalization policy is in place 
and there is one explicit positive authorization from distance 3 in relation allRights, the value of c1 is 
set to 1 and the value of c2 is set to 0 in Lines 4. Finally, the algorithm returns “+” from Line 6 as the 
final derived decision with respect to triple <User, obj, read>. 
3.6.2 Function Propagate() 
In this section, we explain the details of Function Propagate(), which returns all corresponding 
authorizations of a given subject, object, and authorization, shown as <s, o, r> when called from Line 
1 in Algorithm Resolve(). The idea is to extract the part of the subject hierarchy in which s is the only 
sink and the part of the object hierarchy in which o is the only sink. (Note that, to avoid possible 
ambiguities, propagation modes are applied to the subject hierarchy only, and in the object hierarchy 
pass through is always applied.) Then, using top-down breadth-first propagation, all authorizations 
from root nodes are propagated towards s. If a root node has no authorization assigned in the explicit 
matrix, a letter “d” is assigned to it to represent the default authorization. Moreover, the distance of 
each authorization to s is computed, so that it can be exploited by Algorithm Resolve() if the locality 
policy is applied. Note that authorizations are propagated from all paths starting from the source node 
and ending at the destination.  
Figure 9 illustrates Function Propagate(), which inputs parameters s, o, and r (representing the 
subject, object, and authorization on which the conflict should be resolved), as well as pMode 
(representing the propagation mode); also, the function inputs SDAG, ODAG, and EACM, which 
represent the subject and object hierarchies as well as the explicit access control matrix, respectively.  
In Line 1, we extract from SDAG the maximal connected sub-hierarchy SDAG’, in which s is the 
sole sink. Similarly, the maximal connected sub-hierarchy ODAG’, in which o is the sole sink, is 
extracted. 
In Line 2, we create a relation P, which consists of five columns namely, subject, object, right, dis, 
and mode. Values for columns subject, object, right, and mode are taken from the corresponding ones 
in relation EACM (as explained in Section 3.3). Column dis represents the distance of the explicit 
authorization from the subject. Thus, the dis value for explicit authorizations is 0, for an authorization 




Figure 9. Function Propagate(). 
Function Propagate (s, o, r, pMode, SDAG, ODAG, EACM); 
¤  To obtain all authorizations, with respect to triple <s, o, r> by propagating explicit 
authorizations in EACM through subject and object hierarchies (SDAG and ODAG) 
¤  EACM has attributes <subject, object, right, mode> 
¤  SDAG has attributes <subject, child> ,  ODAG has attributes <object, child>  
¤  ancestors(s) = {s} ∪ {x|∃y <y,s>∈SDAG ∧ x∈ancestors(y)} 
¤  ancestors(o) = {o} ∪ {x|∃y <y,o>∈ODAG ∧ x∈ancestors(y)} 
Output: table allRights 














σ  ODAG; 













3.  RootSubjects ←
subject
Π  SDAG′ -
child
Π  SDAG′ -
subject
Π  P; 
4.  RootObjects ←
object
Π  ODAG′ -
child
Π  ODAG′ -
object
Π  P; 
5.  P ← P ∪ RootSubjects × {<o, r, 0, “d”>}; 





Π s × RootObjects × {< r, “d”>}; 
7.  P′ ← 
ssubject≠
σ  P; 
    repeat  








Π  P′   SDAG′; 






'..,'..  P′; 











Π  P’’; 
12.   P ← P ∪ P′ ; 
13. P′ ← 
ssubject≠
σ  P′; 
14. until P′ = ∅ ; 
15. return 
ssubject=




Before completing the Function Propagate(), relation P will record all relevant authorizations 
propagated from all subjects and objects in the sub-graphs to all other nodes.  
In Line 3, we store all unlabelled root subjects of SDAG’ into a relation called RootSubjects. For 
instance, RootSubjects contains {S1, S6} if applied to our motivating example. Similarly, in Line 4, we 
store all unlabelled root objects of ODAG’ into a relation called RootObjects. 
In Line 5, for each root subject with no explicit authorization with respect to r and ancestors of  o, 
we insert an additional row into relation P to assign it the default authorization with distance 0. 
Similarly, in Line 6, for each root object with no explicit authorization with respect to r and ancestors 
of s, we insert an additional row into relation P to assign s the default authorization with appropriate 
distance (which is the distance of the root object from the object). In Line 7, we select as P′ all 
identified authorizations other than those on the sink node s. 
In Lines 8 to 15, we iteratively propagate all of the newly identified authorizations to all of the 
children of the corresponding nodes, stopping when no more nodes exist in P′.  This involves copying 
the authorizations from each node to its children (with the increased distance) (Line 8), blocking or 
overriding the rows based on the propagation mode (Line 9 to 11), inserting the new authorizations 
into P (Line 12), and re-determining which authorizations still need to be propagated further (Line 
13). Finally, Line 15 selects and returns authorizations that correspond to subject s. 
3.6.3 Computational Analysis 
The performance of the Resolve() algorithm depends on the structure of the subject hierarchy, on the 
placement of the explicit authorizations in the explicit access control matrix, and on the choice of 
subject, object, and right. We will examine the performance in practice in the next section, but here 
we summarize its asymptotic behaviour in the worst case. 
Consider first the structure of the subject hierarchy as represented by SDAG. Let r be the number of 
roots of the graph and let n be the total number of subjects in the hierarchy. We assume that at most 
one authorization is explicitly given for every subject-object-right triple; duplicates are meaningless 
and contradicting authorizations can be assumed to be disallowed. Thus, when selected subjects from 
SDAG are matched with explicit authorizations for a given object and right (Line 2 of Function 
Propagate()), at most one explicit authorization is joined to each subject in the subject hierarchy. Let 
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p be the number of paths to the given subject of interest s from subjects assigned explicit 
authorizations for the given object-right pair. Finally, let d be the sum of the path lengths for all paths 
leading from a root or an explicitly authorized subject to s. 
Algorithm Resolve() first calls Function Propagate(). Lines 1 through 7 take time O(n) to select a 
subset of the subjects, attach the explicit authorizations, and set the defaults in the remaining roots. 
Each authorization (default or explicit) is then pushed down each path to the node representing the 
given subject. The loop from Lines 8 though 14 of Function Propagate() thus require O(d) time in 
total. Finally relation P contains all these propagated authorizations, but only those associated with 
the given subject s are returned; this returned relation includes exactly one tuple for each explicit 
authorization and at most one tuple for each root. In summary, Function Propagate() takes time 
O(n+d) and returns a structure of size O(p). 
The remainder of Algorithm Resolve() repeatedly examines subsets of the relation allRights, and 
thus each line requires time at most O(p). Thus the total time for executing Algorithm Resolve() is 
O(p+n+d). Unfortunately, since the number of paths in a directed acyclic graph can grow 
exponentially in the number of nodes in the graph, d is O(n2
n
) in the worst case ( p is O(2
n
)). We shall 
see that in practice, however, the algorithm is typically much better behaved, as the authorization rate 
is often significantly low and also data hierarchies seldom contain the repeated diamond patterns that 
cause the number of paths to explode. 
3.7 Experiments 
We tested our algorithm first on synthetic data. We constructed several random complete directed 
acyclic graphs. In particular, KDAG(n) includes n nodes, one of which is a root and one of which is a 






 edges (i.e., an edge between every pair of nodes), directed in such a way as to prevent 
cycles. Thus such graphs contain many more edges and paths than would be expected in typical 
applications, and constitute good stress tests for our algorithm. 
We executed our algorithm on random KDAGs of three different sizes. For each graph, we 
assigned explicit authorizations to subjects at random, choosing subjects proportionally to the number 
of members. In particular, 0.5% to 10.0% of the graph’s edges were selected at random and their 
source nodes were assigned explicit authorizations. We ran our experiments on a Sun UltraSPARC-II 
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with a 450 MHz processor and 2048 Megabytes of RAM. The program is in C and SQL and was 
complied by  gcc  version 3.3.4 and DB2 version 7. We then measured the CPU time for computing 
the result of the Function Propagate() (that being the dominant part of the algorithm) for each of the 
resulting SDAG-EACM pairs, and averaged over 20 random repetitions with the same parameters. 
Our experiments show that for small authorization rates (which often occur in practical cases), the 
running time is linearly proportional to the authorization rates (see Figure 10). 
We also evaluated our algorithm on the subject hierarchy extracted from an installation of Livelink, 
Open Text’s enterprise content management system1. In Livelink, groups can be arbitrarily structured 
and nested to arbitrary depth. In the environment we tested, the subject hierarchy has over 8000 nodes 
and 22,000 edges. There are 1582 sinks (individual users), each of which represents a real-world 
sample for our experiments. The depths of the induced sub-graphs range from 1 to 11. 
We measured the time of our algorithm for each of the sinks in the Livelink subject hierarchy, 
using an authorization rate of 0.7% of the edges as above. The results are presented in Figure 11, 
plotting the CPU time as a function of d, the sum of the lengths of all paths from explicit and default 
authorizations to the selected sink. 
Figure 11 also compares the execution time of the Resolve() algorithm to that of the Dominance() 





strategy as efficiently as possible under the assumption that there are relatively few explicit 
positive and negative authorizations (i.e., that the authorization rate is low). Thus the comparison 
sheds some light on the overhead imposed by adopting a unified conflict resolution algorithm. It is 
important to note that the propagation of  Dominance() algorithm is dependent on the placement of 
negative authorizations whereas the Resolve() algorithm is not. To account for this, we calculated the 
average of three trials for each data point for the Dominance() algorithm: one where 1% of the 
explicit authorizations are negative, one where half of them are negative, and one where all explicit 
authorizations are negative. 
The Dominance() algorithm is occasionally very fast due to visiting an early negative authorization 
in the hierarchy, but it is not as efficient as Resolve() for objects that have few negative 
authorizations. Figure 11 shows that the run time for the Dominance() algorithm can fall anywhere 




below the time for the Resolve() algorithm, and occasionally it can be higher. On average, over all 
graph sizes and shapes in these experiments, Resolve() required 1260 ms to compute whether or not a 
leaf subject was authorized to access an object, whereas the Dominance() average is 920 ms. Thus the 
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Figure 12. Total paths lengths vs. number of nodes in LiveLink data. 
Finally, Figure 12 restates the behaviour of Algorithm Resolve() against the number of nodes in the 
sub-graph rather than the total length of all paths in the sub-graph. The results show that graphs with 
very many subjects do not necessarily require much more time to resolve than do small graphs. From 
this data we conclude that it is unlikely that the asymptotic worst case performance will be 
problematic in practice.  
3.8 Propagation of Authorizations 
For the of the remainder of the thesis, we assume that ACAD uses a closed system, in which 
permissions are denied by default, and provides positive explicit authorizations only. We also use 
“stoppers” on arbitrary nodes to limit the propagation of positive authorizations: a positive 
authorization may not be propagated across a node that has a corresponding stopper. Thus, the 
propagation of explicit (positive) authorizations is controlled with “stoppers”: associating a stopper 
for authorization p with any subject in the subject hierarchy and any object in the object hierarchy 
prevents the propagation of p as an effective authorization to sub-levels in the subject hierarchy. 
Whereas some other researchers have argued that more general negative authorizations are often 
required in practice [Bertino et al. 1999], we maintain that controlling the propagation of positive 
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authorizations with “stoppers” can produce the same effect, without incurring the cognitive overhead 
inherent in conflict resolution [Rosenthal and Sciore 2001]. In fact, our use of stoppers corresponds 




 with block by propagation, which intuitively means a given 
node is effectively labelled positive only if there is at least one path to the node from at least one of its 
ancestors that assigned an explicit permission with no corresponding negative authorization nodes 
along the path. Note, however, that negative authorizations are fundamentally required in the 
effective matrix, where each subject-object-method triple is explicitly granted or denied. 
3.8.1 Propagation and Stoppers 
Propagation of permissions may be stopped by a stopper authorization at any level in the subject 
hierarchy. Using wildcard “_” to indicate a “whatever” value, each permission p which is represented 
as <_, permit, p, _> has a corresponding stopper that is represented in ACAD as <_, deny, p, _>. For 
example, in Figure 13(a), a subject who is assigned to an access bank that includes stopper <_, deny, 
read, diagnosis_info> cannot read diagnosis_info or its descendants merely because he has read 
permission on encounter. (Access banks are a collection of access authorizations and are formally 
defined in Section 4.2.) That is, the propagation of the read permission is stopped at diagnosis_info. 
However, stoppers do not override an explicit permission. For example, in Figure 3(b), a subject who 
has both read permission and read stopper on encounter can still read this object.  
Stoppers are unlike traditional negative authorizations in models that include both positive and 
negative authorizations, such as proposed by Bertino et al. [Bertino et al. 1999]. A negative 
authorization typically represents a denial of access, whereas a stopper is a mechanism to stop the 
propagation of a positive authorization. In ACAD, if any authorization can be found connecting a 
subject to an object, the corresponding permissions are valid. Because there is no need to check 
whether an authorization is overridden elsewhere, the ACAD approach is easier to administer. We 
will therefore use this mechanism in the remainder of the thesis.  
3.8.2 Propagation Example with Stoppers 
This section provides an enhanced example of propagation in the context of motivating example I, 
explained in Section 1.3.1. Figure 13 illustrates the example, in which for simplicity only read 
operations are depicted. Bank bi includes authorizations <_, permit, read, balance>, <_, deny, read, 
 
 46 
balance>, <_, permit, read, encounter>, and <_, deny, read, encounter>. Note that bi also includes the 
explicit authorizations on sub-objects of encounter, hospitalization-info and diagnosis_info, which are 
not depicted in the figure for simplicity. Bank bi+1 includes authorizations <_, permit, read, balance> 
and <_, deny, read, diagnosis_info>. Bank bi+2 includes authorizations <_, permit, read, 
diagnosis_info>, <_, permit, read, hospitalization_info>, and <_, deny,read,hospitalization_info>; 
and, bi+3 includes authorization <_,deny,read, hospitalization_info>. 
Now assume that subjects Mary, Consultants, Lawyers, and Claude are assigned to banks bi, bi+1, 
bi+2, and bi+3, respectively; and subject  Doctors  is assigned to banks bi+1,   bi+2, and bi+3.  Figure 13(a)  
illustrates  the bank hierarchy with these subjects assigned. Because Dorothy is a member of Doctors 
and Consultants, and hence Lawyers, her effective permissions include reading objects 
hospitalization_info, diagnosis_info, and balance. Even if Surgeons-team1 were stopped from 
inheriting a permission from Doctors, Dorothy would still be permitted that operation because of her 
direct membership in Doctors. Mary’s explicit permissions include reading objects encounter and 
balance, and because of the stopper for Consultants, she cannot inherit permission to read 
diagnosis_info from Lawyers, although she does inherit the ability to read hospitalization_info.  
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(b) Subject hierarchy and effective read authorizations to objects. 
 
(c) Object hierarchy and the subjects that effectively can read it.  
Figure 13. Example of propagation of authorizations. 
Finally, Claude’s effective permissions include reading object balance only: although he is a 
Lawyer, he is explicitly stopped from inheriting permission to read hospitalization_info.  
Figure 13(b) summarizes these and other effective permissions of subjects, using bold type to 
depict explicit permissions. For instance, subject Consultants is explicitly permitted to read object 
balance, and implicitly permitted to read object hospitalization_info. Similarly, Figure 13(c) 
summarizes effective permissions for objects. For instance, object balance is explicitly readable by 
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3.9 Related Work 
Bertino et al. propose an authorization mechanism for relational models in which conflicts are mainly 
resolved based on “the negative authorization takes precedence” policy [Bertino et al. 1999]. They 
also introduce the concept of weak and strong authorizations, which is equivalent to using our 




 when the propagation mode is block by. 
Jajodia et al. use Datalog programs to model access controls of hybrid authorizations with a wide 
range of conflict prevention/resolving policies [Jajodia et al. 2001]. Their modeling stores the raw 
authorizations and computes the effective authorizations for a <subject, object> pair in time linear to 
the size of the Datalog program (rules and ground facts). However, their ground facts include the 
transitive closure of the subject hierarchy (which cannot be computed in linear time) plus all the raw 
authorizations. The potentially large number of ground facts implies that even a linear time solution 
may not be efficient in practice. To answer access control queries efficiently, they suggest 
materializing the entire effective access control. The accessibility check for a given <subject, object> 
pair is thus equivalent to checking the materialized effective access control table (constant time). 
However, considering the formidable size of the effective access controls, which is the product of the 
number of objects and the number of subjects, this approach is not practical for very large systems. 
Moreover, the materialized effective access controls are not self-maintainable with respect to 
updating the explicit authorizations, and even a slight update to the explicit authorizations could 
trigger a drastic modification to the effective ones, making the maintenance task very expensive.  
Propagation of authorizations has been addressed in many works [Ferraiolo et al. 1992; Bertino et 
al. 1999; Osborn and Guo 2000]. However, traditional role-based models often use only the role 
hierarchy for authorizations inheritance. Bertino et al. propose the propagation of authorizations 
within the subject hierarchy in their role-based proposal for relational access control; they assumpe 
that there is no hierarchy among the objects, which are mostly base tables. Osborn and Guo augment 
RBAC models by suggesting to support a group hierarchy independent from the role hierarchy as well 
as authorization inheritance within group members. ACAD is distinguished from other models due to 
propagating authorizations within the subject and object graphs simultaneously, and utilizing the bank 
hierarchy as a means of retaining control for object owners (see Chapter 4).  
Some existing solutions for computing effective authorizations assume that the explicit 
authorizations are propagated on tree-structured data [Damiani et al. 2002; Moses 2005; Yu et al 
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2002; Zhang et al. 2005]. This trivializes conflict resolution since there is only one path between any 
ancestor and a leaf. Moreover, the number of ancestors for a leaf is bounded by the depth of the tree, 
which is usually a small value in real world data [Mignet et al. 2003]. Unfortunately, real world 
subject hierarchies are mostly DAG-structured rather than trees: the UNIX file system allows a user 
to be member of several groups at the same time, and in role-based access control systems, a user can 
be assigned several roles and each role can be assigned to multiple parent roles [Ferraiolo and Kuhn 
1992]. When explicit authorizations are propagated on a DAG subject hierarchy, a leaf subject 
potentially has all subjects as its ancestors, and each ancestor may have several paths reaching to that 
leaf. Therefore, none of the approaches for tree-structured data are appropriate in this setting.  
Cuppens et al. propose a conflict resolution model for documents containing sensitive information 
[Cuppens et al. 1998]. They address the problem of downgrading the classification of these 
documents when their contents become obsolete. Their approach is to impose a strict order of 
preference between rules and does not include any hierarchy among subjects. 
Koch et al. provide a systematic graph-based conflict detection and resolution algorithm based on 
two properties namely, rule reduction and rule expansion [Koch et al. 2002]. Using these properties, 
they transform a conflicting graph into a conflict-free one. However, their approach is applicable only 
to the rules that are related to one another, whereas our approach addresses independent policies. 
Finally, our approach is also different from the combining algorithms in XACML [Moses 2005], in 





FLEXIBLE ADMINISTRATION OF ACCESS CONTROL 
The spectrum of access control administration was introduced in Chapter 1 to illustrate to what extent 
decentralization can be realized. This spectrum covers a wide range of systems from absolutely 
autocratic to completely self-governing. This chapter presents the access control administration 
(ACAD) model. The goal is to be a policy-neutral and uniform model in which various degrees of 
decentralization are supported. It is important to notice that whereas there must be a consistent 
enforcement mechanism to support the enterprises’ access control policies, closely held access control 
may or may not fit the security requirements of various organizations. Furthermore, no matter how 
decentralized the access control administration is, the system must remain secure: its policy must be 
enforced entirely regardless of how restrictive or open the policy is.  
ACAD consists of three layers; each is a directed acyclic graph corresponding to subjects, objects, 
and a layer of access banks. The subject and object were formally defined in Definitions 1 and 2, 
respectively. The access banks are defined in this chapter (Definition 9). Section 4.1 describes why a 
uniform access control mechanism is important. Section 4.2 formalizes authorizations of ACAD. 
Section 4.3 defines applicable authorizations for an object based on the object type. Section 4.4 
introduces omnibank as a means of empowering an object’s owner with all applicable authorizations. 
Section 4.5 illustrates how subjects can manage access control through various types of delegation 
and revocation features in light of customized access banks. Section 4.6 illustrates how omnibanks 
can include several customized omnibanks. Section 4.7 compares access banks to access roles 




It is important as an overarching feature that access control systems be based on a single uniform 
model with respect to both data and metadata (access control data). The goal is to address the needs of 
software companies to provide Enterprise Content Management capabilities2 that fit a wide spectrum 
of security needs for their diverse customer base. Some data needs very tight control; other data can 
be managed by their creators or by the groups within which the creators work. To support 
collaboration, access privileges often have to be granted and revoked in unstructured ways. In 
particular, since the access privileges themselves are typically stored as data, operations to alter those 
privileges (called metadata), whether to update them or to assign privileges with respect to newly 
created subjects or objects, must also be subject to access control.  
Some existing models include separate implicit access control methods for controlling 
authorizations to update the metadata, and other models ignore such authorizations. Yet, the broad 
view of content in an ECM, as depicted in the access control framework of Figure 1, supports the idea 
that information about the subjects and information about access control can (and should) be treated 
just like any other data. Therefore it is important that there is one uniform mechanism to manage data 
whatever its form, and we take that as axiomatic. 
4.2 Access Banks 
Definition 9 (Access Banks). Access banks, which are themselves a subset of the data universe U, are 
collections of access authorizations. Henceforth, we always mean an access bank of authorizations 
when we use the term “bank” or “access bank”, and access banks are depicted by ovals with italic 
labels in all figures. Banks connect a set of subjects to the authorizations for each subject in the set. A 
given bank b ∈ U is a triple <bn, Subj, Auth> where  
— bn is a unique bank name,  
— Subj is a set of subjects,  
— Auth is a non-empty set of access authorizations, and 
                                                     
2 defined by the Association for Information and Image Management <http://www.aiim.org/about-ecm.asp> 
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— ∀ <C, mode, p, O> ∈ Auth, Subj ⊆ C. That is, all subjects associated with a bank must meet all the 
constraints specified in the bank. Through bank b = <bn, Subj, Auth>, any subject that is a member 
of Subj receives all authorizations of Auth. 
Definition 10 (Fertile Bank). A fertile bank is an access bank in which there exists at least one access 
authorization which permits the corresponding subjects to create new access banks.  
We assume that when an authorization is to be enforced, subjects in the system have already been 
authenticated, that is identified and associated with all banks in which the subject is in Subj. The 
method of authentication is outside the scope of this thesis; interested readers should consult 
alternative sources [Burrows et al. 1990; Ellison 1996;  Maughan et al. 1998]. Thus, whenever 
subjects request access to any piece of data (or metadata), the enforcement mechanism is activated to 
check if their access bank list includes a bank that contains the corresponding permission. 
4.2.1 Access Banks Hierarchy 
Banks of authorizations are organized as hierarchies in which source banks export authorizations to 
destination banks. Furthermore, the constraint of an authorization in a destination bank must be at 
least as restrictive as the constraint of the corresponding authorization in the source bank.  
Definition 11 (Bank Hierarchy). The bank hierarchy is a directed acyclic graph <V, E>, where V is 
the set of access banks, and E is a set of edges v1v2 where ∀<v2, Subj2, Auth2>∈ V, ∀<C2, mode, p, 
o2> ∈ Auth2 (¬∃v (vv2 ∈ E)  ∨ (∃ <v1, Subj1, Auth1>∈ V, ∃<C1, mode, p, o1> ∈ Auth1 (v1v2  ∧ C2 
⊆ C1 ∧ o2 ⊆ o1)). 
Thus, for every non-root bank in the hierarchy, its authorizations must all be derived from those of 
its parents, possibly with tighter constraints or fewer objects. For example, in Figure 14, the licensing 
hierarchy between access banks (indicated by arrows) represents delegated privileges, which are 
imported from source banks. If bi+3 imports <C3, mode, p, O3> from <C2, mode, p, O2> in bi+2, then 
C3 and O3 must be subsets of C2 and O2, respectively. Note, however, that the restriction that all 
subjects assigned to a bank must satisfy all constraints in that bank does not imply that the subjects 
assigned to a bank must be a subset of the union of subjects assigned to its parents. 
Recall the ACAD model also includes two other layers: the subject hierarchy (SDAG) and the 
object hierarchy (ODAG) described in Section 3.1 and  depicted in Figure 3. A typical bank hierarchy 
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(BDAG) is depicted in Figure 15. For readability of Figure 15 an abbreviated language is used: for 
instance, M3(d2) corresponds to authorization <_,permit,M3,{d2}>; as another example, M1(d1, d2)+ 
corresponds to authorizations <_,permit, M1, {d1, d2}> and <_,permit, DelegateM1, {d1, d2}>.  
Therefore, in Figure 15, bank b3 contains a privilege to run method M1 on document d1 with grant 
option (+). BDAG is an intermediate layer between subjects and objects; on one hand, a set of 
subjects (either individual users or groups) from SDAG is assigned to each node of BDAG (indicated 
by dot-dashed lines). On the other hand, each access bank contains a set of authorizations on a set of 
objects of ODAG (indicated by dashed lines). We note that objects can be of any type (with arbitrary 
associated methods), including documents or document fragments, groups in the subject hierarchy, or 
even access banks (since an access bank is itself a special object containing a set of privileges on 
some set of objects). 
 
 






























4.2.2 Bank Operations 
We predefine six bank operations, namely read, assignTo, removeFrom, moreConstraints, import, 
and deleteBank. Operation read is the ACAD means of reading content of a given bank. Recall from 
Definition 9, a bank is represented as a triple <bn, Subj, Auth> ; therefore, reading a bank discloses its 
name, the set of subjects assigned to it, and its set of access authorizations. Operation assignTo is the 
method for assigning a subject to a given bank. In fact, assignTo adds one or more subjects to the 
Subj component of a bank. Similarly, removeFrom is an operation to remove a subject from a given 
bank, which means one or more subjects are removed from the Subj part. Operation moreConstraints 
is the method to add more constraints to the C part of any access authorization in the Auth component 
of a given bank. (Recall from Definition 6 that the C part of an access authorization constrains the set 
of subjects that may hold the authorization.) Operation import creates a new bank as a child vertex of 
one or more existing source banks. It takes as parameter pairs of a subset of authorizations and the 
source vertex from which the authorizations are imported to the destination vertex. For example, 
import(b3, {<<_, permit, M,{d1}>, b1 >, <<_, permit, M,{d2}>, b2 >}) creates bank b3 and edges 
b1b3 and b2b3 as depicted in Figure 16(c). Finally, operation deleteBank is the method to delete a 
bank from the bank hierarchy.  
4.2.3 Banks and the Explicit Matrix 
Access banks in ACAD are used to assign a set of subjects to a set of access authorizations. 
Furthermore, access authorizations associate access rights to a set of objects. In fact, an access bank 
can be briefly represented as <S, {<ri, Oi>}> in which S and Oi are given sets of subjects and objects, 
respectively, and ri is an access right. The following predicates can be used to formalize these 
concepts using Datalog: bank(b,s,a) associates subject s to authorization a in the bank with name b, 
and auth(a,c,m,p,o) associates constraint c, mode m, permission p, and object o in the authorization 
with name a. Although Definition 9 is defined in terms of sets of subjects and sets of authorizations, 
these predicates deal with individual elements to simplify the Datalog expressions. Hence, an access 
bank serves as several cells (predicates permit and deny) of an explicit access control matrix. The 
following rules demonstrate this service.  
permit(s, r, o)  bank(_, s, a),  auth(a, _,’permit’, r, o). 
deny(s, r, o)  bank(_, s, a),  auth(a, _,’deny’, r, o). 
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in which “_” means a “whatever” value. Note that this formalism assumes a unique authorization 
name for access authorizations; authorization names serve no purpose within the rest of the thesis. 
Moreover, note that predicates permit and deny are now considered to be intensional, built on top of 
extensional predicates bank and auth.   
4.2.4 Classes of Banks 
In practical environments, there are several characteristics that lead to useful refinements of the 
ACAD model, which are described here. 
ACAD assumes that every object belongs to an owner, and thus an owner access bank is always 
required for each object. The owner of an object is not necessarily the object’s creator, but it is 
initially determined at the time the object is created (see Chapter 5). As a result, as individual users 
create objects (e.g. personal documents), the number of access banks in a system may become quite 
large (e.g. if creators own the object they create), yet many of them are similar. This can be 
initialized parametrically. ACAD provides generic banks to provide such a parametric bank. As 
another characteristic, the model should also provide subjects with the feature of customizing access 
banks. ACAD provides customized banks to provide such features. Furthermore, banks may need to 
be combined to provide more sophisticated capabilities for the corresponding subjects. ACAD 
provides combined banks for this purpose. The generic, customized, and combined banks are depicted 
in Figure 16 and described in more detail as follows: 
Generic bank:  This facility allows the specification of a template for a set of possible access banks. 
To derive an effective access bank from such a template, a specific event acts as a trigger. For 
example, the owner bank (indicated by black ovals in figures) is a generic bank, which is instantiated 
as soon as the first object belonging to a subject is created; the owner id and object id are the 
parameters of the instantiation, and the concrete owner bank includes all authorizations on the object 
determined by a creation time policy (see Chapter 5). Similarly, omnibanks (introduced in Section 
4.4) are generic banks that include all related authorizations on specified objects. Consider an 
application in which every subject who creates an object is its owner; hence, every creator is assigned 
to a concrete owner bank. Figure 16(a) illustrates this example, where subjects S1 and S2 are assigned 
to the owner banks when they create objects d1 and d2, respectively.  
 
 56 
















owner bank 1 
owner bank 2 
d2 d1 
Customized bank: Besides the generic bank, subjects who have at least one import privilege are able 
to create their own customized banks. Hence, every owner can choose an arbitrary subset of the 
authorizations in its owner bank to create a customized bank, and then assign arbitrary subjects to this 
bank. More generally, any subject assigned to a fertile bank may create a new sub-bank with a subset 
of the authorizations and assign other subjects to that new bank. Customized banks thus form the 
bank hierarchy, in which owner banks are the roots. For instance, in Example 1 in Chapter 1, any 
physician may customize the privileges assigned to the physicians group to create a particular bank 
for nurses. In Figure 16(b), owners S1 and S2 have created banks b1 and b2 to access objects d1 and 
d2, respectively. They both have assigned user S3 to these banks. Therefore, S3 has access to both d1 
and d2. S1 or S2 can remove S3’s access at any time, independently.  
 
 
(a) Owner bank as a Generic 
  
(c)  Customized bank (d) Combined bank 
Figure 16. Various access banks in ACAD. 
Combined bank: Lastly, subjects can create a combined bank if they have importable authorizations 
in more than one bank. In other words, a combined bank is a bank that has more than one immediate 
senior bank. For instance, in Example 1 in Chapter 1, an accountant may combine several banks to 
make several medical objects accessible to an insurance representative. In Figure 16(c), owners S1 
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and S2 have created fertile banks b1 and b2 to access objects d1 and d2, respectively; both S1 and S2 
are willing to export authorizations on their documents. They have also assigned subject S3 to their 
banks. Therefore, S3 can create b3 and inherit (import) access authorizations on both d1 and d2. 
Moreover, S3 can assign other subjects (e.g. S4) to b3. Both S1 and S2 can remove access privileges 
for S3 and its dependents (e.g. S4) from their objects by severing the inheritance chain without 
disrupting one another. For example, S1 (the owner of b1) can remove access for S3 and S4, from d1 
simply by removing both edges S3 b1 and b1 b3. Therefore, b3 no longer inherits anything from 
b1.  
4.3 Object Types and Authorizations 
Recall from Definition 4, authorizations in ACAD are not limited to a fixed set of rights such as read 
or write. Instead, various authorizations on objects are defined based on the object types that are 
present in the application. In addition, certain predefined object types and authorizations are required 
by the model.  
The predefined types include a basic type TData, which includes all objects, as well as two 
subtypes TBank and TSubject which represent access banks and subjects (individuals and groups), 
respectively. Authorizations on TData are applicable to all objects in U, while the subtype 
authorizations are applied to objects that are banks or subjects, respectively. We predefine two 
operations read and create applicable to type TData, which therefore define corresponding operations 
for every type through inheritance. Thus, permission to read (or create) an object is a permission to 
call a method read (or create) on an object of any type. (For readability, we give authorizations the 
same names as their corresponding methods.)  
We also define eight specific authorizations for objects of TBank and TSubject types: assignTo, 
removeFrom, import, addConstraint, and deleteBank are applicable to type TBank only; and 
subscribeTo, unsubscribeFrom¸ and deleteSubject are applicable to type TSubject only. The TBank 
authorizations correspond to the bank operations: For instance, a subject enjoying permission 
assignTo on bank b is permitted to assign subjects to the Subj component of b. For authorizations 
applicable to type TSubject, a subject enjoying permissions subscribeTo, unsubscribeTo, and 
deleteSubject on subject S is permitted to subscribe other subjects to (group) S, unsubscribe other 
subjects from S, and delete subject S, respectively. Hence, in contrast to most other models, any user 
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can potentially update the group hierarchy in our model, depending on the permissions assigned to 
that user. 
4.4 Object Creation and Omnibanks  
This section introduces the omnibank, which is the aggregation of all owner banks for a particular 
subject. Consequently, it is the collection of all authorizations for a subject (whether a user, a group, 
or an application) on its own objects. The omnibank also serves as the root of the bank hierarchy 
associated with the owner. In fact, the omnibank is the root of the owner’s whole object hierarchy.  
As stated in Section 4.2.4, an owner bank is a generic bank, which is instantiated when an object is 
created. This section specifies how various types of authorizations are combined in an omnibank for 
subject S when various types of objects are created, whether by S or by other subjects, and owned by 
S. For simplicity, we assume that an object’s owner is initially assigned all possible permissions on 
that object; this is relaxed in Chapter 5. Therefore,  
Axiom 1. Every subject who owns at least one object has an associated omnibank.  
Figure 17(a) illustrates that an omnibank initially includes twelve access authorizations: six 
permissions and six corresponding stoppers. Recall from Definition 6 that each access authorization 
consists of four components: a constraint (Cj
i
), a mode (permit/deny), a permission (pm), and a set of 
objects (on). Cj
i
 constrains the set of subjects Sj who may be explicitly permitted to hold (or stopped 
from holding) permission pm on the set of objects on. In the absence of stoppers, all members of the 
subject set Sj, assigned to the bank, implicitly enjoy the authorization on the set of objects on and all 
their descendants. Since subjects assigned to a bank are given all the authorizations within it, they 
must satisfy all constraints by being a subset of the intersection of all Cj
i
 for all i, i.e., ij
i
jj CCS I=⊆ . 
Using this notation, authorization <C0
1
, permit, read, b0> in omnibank b0 means that subjects 
assigned to the bank are permitted to invoke method read on object b0 and its descendants. For 
example, assume an application in which initially the creator is assigned to such a bank; therefore, it 
means that creators can read all banks in their bank hierarchy. In applications where the creator is not 
necessarily the object owner, the creator is not automatically assigned to such bank and consequently 
the object owner retains control. 
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Similarly, the third and fifth authorizations mean that subjects assigned to the bank are permitted to 
invoke method assignTo (removeFrom) to add (remove) subjects to (from) the Subj component of 
bank b0, and of its descendants. Owners can thus delegate and revoke all their rights to other subjects, 
including the rights of delegation and revocation.  
Authorization <C0
7
, permit, import(Rights), b0>  in omnibank b0 means that subjects assigned to 
the bank are permitted to invoke method import to import authorizations from source bank b0. This 
authorization essentially means that the importer is able to create a child bank for the source bank. 
Hence, as soon as a subject invokes such a permission, a customized omnibank is created and 
assigned to the subject. Customized omnibanks, elaborated in Section 4.6, are sub-elements of the 
original omnibank. In order to control permissions on child banks, the exporting subject can limit 
authorizations of the customized omnibank by parameter Rights of the import permission. This 
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(b) Additional predefined authorizations 
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,  deny, read, b0>,  
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3
,  permit, assignTo, b0>, 
<C0
4
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,  permit, removeFrom, b0>, 
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,  permit, import(omniRights), b0>, 
<C0
8
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, deny, deleteBank, children(b0)>, 
(a) Initial predefined authorizations in 
omnibank b0 
(c) Additional predefined authorizations 
when object d1 is created 






, permit, addConstraint, b0> in omnibank b0 means that subjects assigned to 
the bank are permitted to invoke method addConstraint to add more constraints to any authorization 
of bank b0, and its descendants. In other words, object owners can update the C part of any 
authorization in their bank hierarchy. 
Finally, let children(bj) denotes all children of bank bj. Authorization <C0
11
, permit, deleteBank, 
children(b0)>  in omnibank b0 means that subjects assigned to the bank are permitted to invoke 
method deleteBank to delete any children of b0 (but not b0 itself). For simplicity, we assume that only 
leaf banks can be deleted. Therefore, with this initialization, another right that object owners initially 
enjoy is the right of deleting leaf banks from their bank hierarchy.  
Figure 17(a) also illustrates six initial stopper authorizations in omnibank b0 to stop the propagation 
of read, assignTo, removeFrom, import, addConstraint, and deletBank permissions for the subject 
assigned to bank b0. Although stoppers are not functioning in omnibanks due to coexistence of 
explicit permissions, their presence allows them to be exported to other banks in the hierarchy. In this 
way, we can maintain the property of the hierarchy that authorizations in descendent nodes always 
have corresponding authorizations in some ancestor node (cf. Definition 11). 
Figure 17(b) illustrates eight other predefined authorizations (including four stoppers) that are 
added to the omnibank as soon as a group or individual (i.e. an object of type TSubject) is created. For 
instance, when a subject S1 creates subject S2, corresponding authorizations, illustrated in Figure 
17(b), will be added to the owner’s omnibank (which is assumed to be b0 in this example). 
Authorization <C0
13
, permit, read, S2> in omnibank b0 means that S2’s owner is permitted to invoke 
method read in order to read the value of S2 and any of its descendants. Similarly, permission 
deleteSubject in omnibank means that the owner can delete S2 or any of its descendants. As is true for 
all objects, it is assumed again that only leaf subjects (individuals or empty groups) can be deleted. 
Moreover, Figure 17(b) illustrates that the owner enjoys permission subscribeTo (unsubscribeFrom), 
and therefore is permitted to add (remove) members to (from) S2. Note that a subject is represented as 
a member of S2 by linking it as a child vertex of S2. Moreover, Figure 17(b) includes four stopper 
authorizations in omnibank b0 to stop the propagation of read, subscribeTo, unsubscribeFrom, and 
deleteSubject permissions, respectively. As before, although stoppers are not functioning in 
omnibanks due to coexistence of explicit permissions, their presence is important so that owners can 
export them to other banks in the hierarchy when needed.  
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Finally, Figure 17(c) illustrates the case in which an object d1 (i.e. any other object of type TData) 
is created. Authorization <C0
21
, permit, read, d1> in omnibank b0 means that the owner is permitted 
to invoke method read in order to read the value of d1 and any of its descendants, and the read 
stopper in Figure 17(c) is for export purposes. Depending on the data type and on the policies in force 
(see Chapter 5), other authorizations will also be added to the omnibank when d1 is created.  
In summary, Figure 17 illustrates all initial authorizations for a particular subject, S1, who is 
considered to be the owner of an object of type TSubject, S2, and an object of type TData, d1. When 
an object is created, the omnibank of the owner is updated to include new authorizations for all 
methods of the new object if not already included. Based on these authorizations, S1 can extend his 
bank hierarchy by creating other banks and importing arbitrary authorizations from his omnibank, b0. 
In this way, he can share his data with other subjects.  
Figure 18 illustrates a system with m objects (o1 to om), n subjects (S1 to Sn), all of which own one 
or more objects, and therefore n omnibanks (omni1 to omnin). Recall that in all figures of this thesis, 
subject-bank assignments are depicted with dashed-dot lines, bank-object assignments are depicted 
with dashed lines, and omnibanks are depicted with black ovals; also, subject names start with a 
capital letter, and bank names are italic.  
 
 
Figure 18. Omnibanks in a system with n subjects. 
4.5 Access Control Administration 
In the last section, we explained that subjects are initially authorized for their own objects within 
omnibanks. Now we explain how users manage the access authorizations for their data. As the 
running example, we assume user Sx owns a newly created object d1 of type TData; and therefore, his 





o1 om oi ok 
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For the rest of this section, we explain how Sx can utilize the corresponding bank hierarchy 
(depicted with triangles in Figures 19-22) to delegate its authorizations in any of three forms, namely 
simple delegation, delegation by agent, and enhanced delegation, and to retain control by revoking 
authorizations in two ways, namely weak and strong revocation. 
4.5.1 Simple Delegation 
In the simple delegation mechanism, subject Sx creates bank bi importing authorization <Ci, permit, p, 
d1> from his bank hierarchy  and delegates permission p to other subjects or group of subjects (such 
as Sa and Sb in Figure 19) by assigning them to bi. Ci constrains who is eligible to have authorization 
p. Thus, in order to be assigned to bi, Sa and Sb must be subsets of Ci, and once they are assigned, they 
are eligible to invoke method p on object d1 and its descendants.  
 
 
Figure 19. Simple delegation in ACAD. 
4.5.2 Delegation by Agent 
In the delegation by agent mechanism, subject Sx creates banks bi and bi+1 importing authorizations 
<Ci, permit, p, d1> and <Ci+1, permit, assignTo, bi>, respectively, from his bank hierarchy. 
Moreover, Sx assigns other subjects (such as Sc and Sd in Figure 20) to bi+1 as his agents so that they 
can delegate permission p on d1 to others (such as Se and Sf in Figure 20) by assigning them to bi as 
long as the latter subjects meet constraint Ci. Therefore, if Ci excludes Sd as an eligible subject for 
invoking method p on d1, Sd cannot be assigned to bi. In such a case, Sd can only assign other subjects 









to bi on Sx’s behalf, but he has no other permission on d1 or on bi itself. In this form of delegation, Sc 










Figure 20. Delegation by agent in ACAD. 
4.5.3 Enhanced Delegation 
In the enhanced delegation mechanism, subject Sx creates bank bi+2 importing permission import from 
his bank hierarchy, and assigns Sy to it so that Sy can create new children for bi+2 on Sx’s behalf. 
However, merely because Sy creates such banks, does not mean that he has full control over them; 
instead, Sx can adjust Sy’s authorizations on such banks through the rights argument of import. For 
instance, if Sx wants to prevent Sy from deleting such banks, he may include authorization <Public-
{Sy}, permit, deleteBank, bc> in the rights argument. Note that Public-{Sy} means every subject in the 
universe but Sy, and bc refers to the child bank being created. Also, in order for Sy to be able to invoke 
method p on d1 or delegate permission p to others, Sx must include authorization <
m
iC 2+ , permit, p, d1> 
in the rights argument. Now, Sy has at least two options: one is to create a child for bi+2 containing 
permission p only; and the other is to create a bank, say bj,, including the import permission. Both are 
mechanisms to delegate the permission on Sx’s behalf. The former is without and the latter is with the 
option for further delegation. Of course, Sy is not obliged to use his delegation right. Figure 21 shows 
Sx 
omnix 
<Ci, permit, p, d1> 
bi 
d1 








the case that Sy has delegated the import permission to Sz through bj, and similarly Sz has delegated it 




Figure 21. Enhanced delegation in ACAD. 
It is important to notice that Sx has necessary controls on all banks bi+2, bj, and bk, while Sy has 
control on banks bj and bk, and Sz has control on bank bk only. For example, if Sy wants to prevent Sz 
from invoking method p on d1 or prevent him from delegating the import permission to Sh, he can 
adjust the rights argument of bj with authorizations <Public-{Sz}, permit, p, d1> or <Public-{Sh}, 
permit, import, _>, respectively. 
It is also important to notice that Sx does not have to be the owner of d1 in order to exploit the 
above delegation mechanisms. In general, once banks bi, bi+1 and bi+2 exist, any subject G which 
holds authorizations <{G}, permit, assignTo, bi>, <{G}, permit, assignTo, bi+1>, and <{G}, permit, 
assignTo, bi+2> can invoke simple delegation, delegation by agent, and enhanced delegation 
mechanisms, respectively, to delegate permission p on d1. 
Other than preventing grantees from doing particular operations in the future, there is often a need 
to undo or revoke some given permissions. For the rest of this section, we explain how subjects retain 
control over their own objects even though many authorizations have been delegated. We provide two 
levels of revocation, weak and strong.  
bk 






















4.5.4 Weak Revocation 
Assume bank bi with authorization <Ci, permit, p, d1>. Assigned subjects to a bank containing 
authorization <C, permit, removeFrom, bi> can revoke permission p on d1 for any subject enjoying it 
through bi by removing the subject from the set assigned to the bank. We call this mechanism a weak 
revocation since if the revoked subject is reassigned to bi or if the subject enjoys the permission 
through other banks, he still can invoke method p on d1.  
4.5.5 Strong Revocation 
Strong revocation is feasible by exploiting authorization constraints. Assume bank bi with 
authorization <Ci, permit, p, d1>. Any subject who is able to further constrain bi can strengthen 
constraint Ci so that specific subjects are revoked from bi and all its descendants, since constraints for 
a child bank must be subsets of constraints of its parents. No subject can reassign them to bi or its 
descendant since the assignment must be in accordance with the constraint. However, if a subject 
enjoys permission p through banks other than bi or its descendants, he still can invoke method p on d1. 
But a given subject Sx can strongly revoke a given subject Sh
 
from invoking method p on Sx’s 
documents by excluding Sh at a very top bank of the hierarchy, usually in  Sx’s omnibank. Note that if 
this is done, Sk cannot access any documents of Sx. 
Figure 21 illustrates a delegation chain from Sx to Sg   through banks bi+2, bj, and bk. Since these 
banks are in Sx’s bank hierarchy, Sx has full control on all of them. In general, through the delegation 
chain, grantors retain control over grantees. Therefore, owners have the most control since they 
initiate the chain. For instance, Sx can (weakly or strongly) revoke Sz from bank bj in order to prevent 
him from further importing permission p on d1. This is a selective revocation since it does not impact 
any other subject in the delegation chain, including Sg who was assigned to the chain by Sz. However, 
in a similar manner Sx can revoke Sg too from the chain if he wishes to cascade his previous revoke. 
Moreover, to completely cascade revocation, Sx does not need to know explicitly which grantees have 
received the import permission from Sz since he can revoke them all by setting Cj to empty.  
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4.6 Another Look at Omnibanks 
As explained in the last section, exporters retain control over their objects (including banks) by 
customizing a sub-element of the omnibank of importers. Figure 22 illustrates the omnibank of 
subject Sy that has been granted import permissions delegated by Sx and Sx’. 




 that are customized by Sx and Sx’, 










, and provide simultaneous access to both Sx and Sx’ hierarchies. However, as illustrated in 
the figure, customized omnibanks import their authorizations from the bank hierarchy of the 





, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 22. Omnibanks and customized omnibanks. 
4.7 Access Banks vs. Access Roles  
Access banks in ACAD are similar to access roles in Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [Ferraiolo 
et al. 2001] in which roles usually reflect job titles. Similar to roles in RBAC models, access banks in 
ACAD map a many-to-many relationship between subjects and objects. Therefore assigning either a 
new subject or object to a bank is one operation corresponding to multiple permissions being granted.  
However, in traditional role-based models, roles form a hierarchical relationship for the sake of 
efficiency [Ferraiolo et al. 2001]. For example, a project manager has his special permissions as well 
as all permissions of the project developers reporting to him. Thus, permissions are propagated 












and the bank hierarchy instead represents all delegation chains for authorizations. We exploit the bank 
hierarchy not for propagation of permissions, but instead as a means of retaining control for grantors. 
This feature allows us to decentralize access control administration. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
RBAC models have the major innate restriction of a central control over the role hierarchy which 
consequently impedes the model enhancement towards supporting scalable administrative 
expansions. If it is necessary to have a role hierarchy in an application, ACAD can simulate it as a 
part of the subject hierarchy (possibly combined with a group hierarchy) and access banks can remain 
to handle the decentralized delegation needs.  Chapter 7 shows an application of access banks for a 
system, called user-managed access control, in which both roles and groups exist.  
4.8 Related Work 
Sections 2.1-2.4 extensively addressed the related work of access control administration models. This 
section consists of a literature review on storage decentralization mechanisms as well as a comparison 
between  our delegation and revocation mechanisms and that of existing proposals.  
The access control matrix is typically large and sparse when subjects or objects can not be 
classified to a limited number of groups. Decentralization techniques such as access control lists and 
capabilities improve the storage efficiency. The former technique stores the information from the 
matrix column-wise while the latter is row-wise. The Compressed Accessibility Map (CAM) is an 
enhanced technique on capability lists [Zhang 2005]. The CAM algorithms exploit structural locality 
of subjects’ accessibility on a hierarchical data to construct a more efficient tree. Therefore, instead of 
keeping a list of all accessible nodes, they only keep some crucial nodes and place some additional 
information on them, so that we can check whether an arbitrary node can be accessed or not by 
simply looking at relevant crucial nodes. The CAM technique also addresses granularity explained in 
Section 2.4. 
Finally, the simple delegation and delegation by agent, in ACAD, are similar to delegation 
mechanisms in several models [Muffett 1990; Bertino et al. 1999; Barka and Sandhu 2000a; Barka 
and Sandh 2000b; Zhang L. et al. 2002; Zhang L. et al. 2003; Zhang X. et al. 2003; Joshi and Bertino 
2006; Ravichandran and Yoon 2006; Wang and Osborn 2006]. Furthermore, simple delegation and 
cascading revocation have been proposed as part of distributed network security models and trust 
management systems [Blaze et al. 1996; Rivest and Lampson 1996; Li et al. 2002] However, the 
 
 68 
ACAD model is distinguished from other models by its enhanced delegation and revocation 
mechanisms explained in Sections 4.5.3 through 4.5.5. Weak and strong revocations in the work by 
Bertino et al. are basically based on explicit and implicit authorizations; whereas, ACAD exploits 
removal from access banks and constraints, respectively, for such purposes. In Section 7.3, ACAD 






Chapter 4 specifies an access control administration model, called ACAD, to support the spectrum of 
autocratic to self-governing systems. This chapter specifies the means of constraining decentralized 
administration by which ACAD can be adjusted anywhere on the spectrum, in order to meet the needs 
of an enterprise. This means provides the flexibility of defining various levels of decentralization for 
different types of objects in the system. 
As new subjects and new objects are introduced into a running system, and as subjects delegate and 
revoke access control permissions, the access control state changes, as reflected in the metadata. 
Thus, depending on the current state of access control, several possible new states can be realized in 
response to subjects’ actions. The space of all possible access control states forms a network, with 
transitions similar to those in a finite state automaton. An access control policy is a set of rules under 
which access control states may evolve: in a properly designed system, all reachable states conform to 
the access control policy chosen by the enterprise.  
Recall from Chapter 1 that although access control policies and the generality of their enforcement 
must be kept in the hands of the enterprise (whether centrally managed or managed in a distributed 
fashion), there are several reasons to decentralize access control administration (the permission to 
update the access control metadata) either for the whole system or for a subset of object types in the 
system. Sharing data, including selectively delegating and revoking administrative permissions on the 
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associated metadata, may be supported more reliably and more efficiently by a flexible decentralized 
access control administration. Consequently, the spectrum of access control administrations raises an 
important question: to what extent can decentralization be realized? The challenge is to ensure that 
the enterprise’s policies are enforced.  
This chapter finds the answer by using creation time policies to define the network of permissible 
access control states: each time an object is created by a subject, an appropriate set of permissions on 
the object are given to various subjects. This specifies the initial state for each row (object) in the 
explicit access control matrix, which implies the space of reachable states for that row. At one 
extreme, if neither delegation nor revocation permissions are ever allowed, the permissions on that 
object will never change. However, in practice, policies are rather complex and the access control 
metadata continually evolves over time as the access control states change. This evolution of 
metadata is difficult for human administrators to manage state by state. By appropriately initializing 
permissions at object creation time, a set of administrative policies is established, and these constrain 
subsequent access control state transitions. As an analogy, creation time policies control objects in 
our system much like genetic codes control cells in biological systems.   
The contribution of this chapter is a flexible model for administration by which enterprises are able 
to adjust the amount of centralized control by defining precisely what permissions are initially to be 
held by whom at the time of each object’s creation. By appropriately configuring these creation time 
policies, organizations can adjust their access control systems to the desired points along the 
spectrum. 
Creation time policies dictate the states of the explicit access control matrix. So that the power of 
creation time policies can be presented in a concrete setting, we assume one mechanism for deriving 
the effective access control matrix. In particular, this chapter assumes a closed system, in which 
permissions are denied by default, and only positive explicit permissions are provided; the 
propagation of explicit positive permissions are controlled with “stoppers” (Section 3.8). Section 5.4 
argues that the power of creation time policies can be applied equally well to other settings for 
deriving an effective matrix from an explicit one. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, the specification of the ACAD 
constraining mechanism is discussed. Section 5.2 justifies the model by showing how it could be used 
to control several existing systems. Section 5.3 describes how the current chapter is applied in 
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ACAD. Section 5.4 provides further discussion on power of creation time policies. Finally, Section 
5.5 reviews the literature of related access control models and frameworks.  
5.1 The Constraining Mechanism 
We first translate access control policies to sets of first order logic rules. Figure 23 depicts the BNF 
notation which is used for ACAD policy enforcement rules, following the syntax of Active-U-
Datalog language [Bertino et al. 1998]. This language can be used to express active rules that are fired 
when various events occur (e.g. updates). ACAD applies this mechanism to insert into the explicit 
access control matrix the authorizations that are defined according to creation time policies. Each 
policy rule consists of a head and a body. The head is one of the reserved predicates, such as permit, 
deny, subscribeTo, unsubscribeFrom, deleteSubject, assignTo, removeFrom, import, addConstraint, 
and deleteBank. While predicates permit and deny directly update the explicit access control matrix, 
other predicates cause an indirect change to access rights. The body consists of both reserved and 
application-based predicates. The application-based predicates are Boolean functions that typically 
define the hierarchical relationship within the objects involved in the rule. There may be three types 
of prefixes (so called sign) for each predicate: + indicates that the predicate is an insert, - indicates 
that the predicate is a delete, and ¬ represents a logical negation.  
 
 
Figure 23. BNF notation of policy enforcement rules. 
Moreover, ACAD groups together sets of rules that are triggered under a specific event, such as 
object creation. In this work, we define admin domains as sets of creation time policies that are 
invoked when an object is created.  
Policy_Enforcement_Rule ::=  Body | ε  ( + | - ) Head. 
Head ::= Reserved_Predicate 
Body ::= Body , Body | Predicate  
Predicate ::= Sign Reserved_Predicate | Sign Application_Predicate 
Reserved_Predicate ::=  permit | deny | bank | auth | juniorOf 
Application_Predicate ::= create | inherit … 




As explained in Section 1.2, the explicit matrix defines access constraints used to derive the 
effective permissions represented by the effective matrix. As in Section 3.5, in ACAD, the explicit 
access control matrix is transformed to the corresponding effective matrix by translating each 
predicate permit to one or more predicates allow. Each propagation strategy may produce a different 
effective matrix. If stoppers are in place, a given permission is propagated along the edges of both 
object and subject hierarchies until meeting a stopper or a sink node. Finally, every non-filled cell of 
the effective matrix will be represented by a corresponding predicate disallow.  
Section 5.1.1 describes, via the context of the healthcare example, how this model allows us to 
apply creation time policies to decentralize access control administration. 
5.1.1 Creation Time Policies 
Recalling Example I, introduced in Section 1.3 and illustrated in Figure 13, assume that St. Mary’s 
Hospital is the owner of the medical records. However, also assume that elements of the medical 
record are created by various subjects, such as the hospital staff or the patient, according to the 
following scenario: 
Receptionists create a blank medical record when a new patient arrives. 
Nurses create and append new encounters to an existing medical record. 
Doctors create the diagnosis information. They can also create and append therapy sections to an 
existing record. 
A patient’s family may create (and thereby “sign”) the consent section. 
Also assume the set of access control policies described in the XACML use cases [Kudo 2001; 
Damodaran and Adams 2001], restated as three sets of creation time policies:. Figure 24 presents 
these policies in the ACAD model.  In the remainder of this section, each set of policies is first stated 
informally and then the corresponding formal presentation is exaplined in detail. For simplicity, we 
assume that every subject (including St Mary’s here) has an associated omni bank, and when a new 
object x is created, all of the corresponding authorizations are automatically added to the omni bank 
of its owner, identified by the function omni(x). Moreover, in this scenario, all customized banks are 
created underneath the omni bank. 
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CTP1 is triggered when a medical_record is created, invoking the following rules: St. Mary’s 
hospital, the owner of the medical_record, enjoys all permissions. The patient can read patient_info. 
Doctors and nurses can read medical_record.  
The body of the rule of CTP1 in Figure 24 is a conjunction of five application-based predicates 
namely medical_record, patient_info, patient, doctors, and nurses, as well as functions omni and 
Skole,  that uniquely generates object ids using two input parameters (the first parameter represents an 
object, and the second parameter is used as an index). Predicate medical_record determines whether 
its input parameter is an object of type medical record. The prefix + indicates that the active rule 
applies when this medical record is just created and its information is being inserted into the system. 
Predicate patient_info determines if its first parameter is the patient information of the medical record 
determined by the second parameter. Predicate patient determines if its first parameter is the subject 
for this medical record. Similarly, predicate doctors (and nurses) determines if the parameter is a 
doctor (nurse). The head of CTP1 includes three reserved predicates namely auth, bank, and juniorOf. 
Predicates auth and bank were defined in Section 4.2.3. Predicate juniorOf represents the bank 
hierarchy; its first input denotes a child bank, and the other input is its parent.  
Therefore, CTP1 in Figure 24 creates two authorizations a1 and a2 to read patient_info and 
medical_record, respectively, as well as creating banks b1 and b2 (as child banks of omni) to hold 
those authorizations. Moreover, the patient is initially assigned to b1, and doctors and nurses are 
assigned to b2.  
CTP2 is triggered when an encounter is created, invoking the following rules: Doctors can create 
diagnosis_info. The patient’s family can sign the consent.  
Similarly, CTP2 in Figure 24 creates a new authorization a3 (as a permission to create a diagnosis) 
as well as a bank b3, which includes a3, and is a direct child of the appropriate omni bank. In addition, 
doctors are assigned to this bank. 
CTP3 is triggered when the consent is created, invoking the following rules: The patient’s family 
can read encounter. The patient’s family can also delegate read permission on diagnosis_info to 





Figure 24. Creation time policies for the medical record use case. 
CTP1: 
+medical_record(M),  patient_info(PI, M),  patient(S1,M) , doctors(S2), nurses(S3), 
omni(M)=b,  Skolem(M,1)=b1, Skolem(M,2)=b2, Skolem(M,-1) = a1, 
Skolem(M,-2)=a2    
+auth(a1, ‘Public’, ‘permit’,’read’, PI), +bank(b1,S1,a1), +juniorOf(b1,b), 




+encounter(E, M), omni(M)=b, doctors(S1) , Skolem(M,3)= b3, Skolem(M,-3)= a3  
+auth(a3, ‘Public’, ‘permit’,’createDiagnosis’, E). 
 
+encounter(E, M), consent(C, E), family(F, P), patient(P,M) ,  omni(M)=b, 
Skolem(M,4)=b4, Skolem(M,-4)=a4   
+auth(a4, ‘Public’, ‘permit’,’sign’, C), +bank(b4, F, a4), +juniorOf(b4,b). 
 
CTP3:  
+consent(C, E), encounter(E, M), create(F, C),  family(F, P), patient(P, M),  
 omni(M)=b, Skolem(M,5)=b5, Skolem(M,-5)=a5     
+auth(a5, ‘Public’, ‘permit’,’read’, E), +bank(b5, F, a5), +juniorOf(b5,b). 
 
+consent(C, E), encounter(E, M), create(F,C),  family(F, P), patient(P,M) , 
diagnosis_info(DI,E), omni(M)=b, Skolem(M,6)=b6, Skolem(M,-6)=a6, 
Skolem(M,7)=b7, Skolem(M,-7)=a7   
+auth(a6, ‘Public’, ‘permit’,’read’, DI), +bank(b6,  null, a6), +juniorOf(b6,b), 
+auth(a7, ‘Public’, ‘permit’,’assignTo’, b6), +bank(b7, F, a7), +juniorOf(b7,b). 
 
+consent(C,E), omni(M)=b, Skolem(M,8)=b8, Skolem(M,-8)=a8   
+auth(a8, ‘Public’, ‘deny’,’change’, C),+bank(b8, ‘Public’, a8), +juniorOf(b8,b). 
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The rest of the rules in Figure 24 are similar. Predicate create in CTP3 has two parameters to 
indicate a subject and an object, respectively, and determines whether the subject has created the 
object. Note that it is assumed the system is defined such that encounter(x, y) can be true only if 
medical_record(y). The last rule of CTP3 defines a stopper. It specifies that nobody can inherit 
permission to execute method change on a consent part of any medical record. In particular, this rule 
stops the propagation of permission change, given to the owner of a medical record in the second rule 
of CTP1, to the element consent, even though it will be propagated to the element encounter. 
5.2 Expressivity of the Mechanism 
This section validates the constraining mechanism by investigating suitable object creation policies 
that could be used to achieve the goals of some existing systems, including the UNIX file system, the 
DB2 database system, and the LiveLink enterprise content management system. Note that throughout 
the rest of this chapter, we define creation time policies directly on the explicit access control matrix, 
and not via access banks, to simplify explanations. In UNIX, there are two types of objects, file and 
directory, for which two sets of creation time policies are defined in Section 5.2.1. In DB2, there is 
one object type, namely schema, which contains many sub-types such as base table, view, index, etc; 
Section 5.2.2 defines a set of creation time policies for the schema. In LiveLink, there exist many 
types of objects having disparate access control requirements; accordingly, several creation time 
policies are defined in Section 5.2.3 to handle administrative needs in such systems.  
5.2.1 Creation Time Policies for the UNIX File System 
In UNIX, access control administration is partially decentralized among the objects’ owners, but in a 
very restricted manner. In that system, there are three access permissions: read, write, and execute. 
When an object (file or directory) is created in UNIX, a predefined list of permissions for the object is 
automatically created. Then, the object owner can assign or change the permissions mode for three 
types of subjects: user, group, and other. UNIX does not support hierarchies among the subjects (that 
is, groups cannot be nested) nor among the objects (permissions cannot be granted on subfiles, and 
permissions are not inherited from directories to subdirectories or to contained files).  
For simplicity, assume a given set of default permissions are based on the following policy: Files 
are readable and writable by the owner, readable for groups, and not accessible to others (in Unix’s 
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notation, file permissions are initialized to 640). Directories are readable, writable, and executable by 
the owner, and also readable and executable to groups and others (corresponding to Unix’s 755). 
Moreover, subjects can read an object if they have execute permission on all directories in the path 
from the root to the parent of the object and read permission on the object itself; subjects can delete 
an object if they have execute permission on all directories in the path from the root to the parent of 
the object and write permission on that parent (they need no specific permissions on the file itself). 
System administrators (super-users) have all permissions on all files and directories. These default 
permissions can be simulated by applying creation time policies as follows, see Figure 25: 
 
 
Figure 25. Creation time policies for UNIX file permissions. 
U-CTP1 is triggered when a file is created, invoking the following rules: The owner enjoys 
permissions read and write on the file; execute permissions are not inherited. Group members enjoy 
permission read on the file.  Super-users have all permissions. 
U-CTP2 is triggered when a directory is created, invoking the following rules: The owner enjoys 
all permissions on the directory. Group members and others enjoy read and execution permissions on 
the directory. Again, super-users have all permissions. 
U-CTP1: 
+file(F), owner(S, F)  +permit(S, read, F). 
+file(F), owner(S, F)  +permit(S, write, F). 
+file(F), owner(S, F)  +deny(S, execute, F). 
+file(F), sameGroup(S,F)  +permit(S, read, F). 
+file(F), superUser(S)  +permit(S,*,F). 
U-CTP2:  
+directory(D), owner(S, D)  +permit(S, *, D). 
+directory(D)  +permit(*, read, D). 
+directory(D)  +permit(*, execute, D). 
+directory(D), sameGroup(S,D)  +deny(S, write, D). 





The body of the first rule in U-CTP1 includes two application-based predicates, namely file and 
owner. Predicate +file determines whether a new file F (not a directory) has been created. Predicate 
owner has two input parameters: a subject and an object, respectively; and, determines whether the 
subject is the owner of the object. Therefore, the first rule in U-CTP1 states that if the file F has been 
created, and user S is its owner, S is permitted to execute method read on F. Similarly, the second rule 
in U-CTP1 states that if the file F has been created, and user S is its owner, S is permitted to execute 
method write on F. The third rule emphasizes that the owner cannot inherit permission execute from 
its group or others. The fourth rule states that users who are in the same group as the file are permitted 
to execute method read on the file, where predicate sameGroup determines whether S and F are in the 
same group. Finally, the fifth rule in U-CTP1 states that super-users have all permissions on files, 
where predicate superUser determines whether S is a super-user. U-CTP2 is similar to U-CTP1 and 
expresses policies that are applicable to directories, where predicate directory determines whether its 
input parameter is a directory (not a file). 
Note that Figure 23 illustrates creation time policies only, and it does not address other policies in 
UNIX. For example, in UNIX, users can create files and directories only if they have permissions 
execute and write on the current path. Such a policy can be expressed in ACAD as: permit(S, create, 
*) :-  permit(S, execute, currentDirectory()), permit(S, write, currentDirectory()). However, our focus 
here is on creation time policies, which are distinguished from other policies by having at least one 
inserting predicate (i.e. prefixed by +) in their body, and a +permit or +deny in their head.  This 
predicate acts as a trigger that enables various permissions to be defined. 
5.2.2 Creation Time Policies for the DB2 Database System 
This section considers controlling access to data in IBM’s DB2, and investigates how creation time 
policies can decentralize its administration. There are various objects and therefore various privileges 
in DB2. Hence, this section focuses on objects of one of the types schemas, tables, views, and 
routines only. However, interested readers can expand our explanation to other types of objects such 
as triggers, functions, table spaces, etc. 
Table 4 illustrates the major DB2 object types and related privileges. A schema is a logical 
classification of named objects such as tables, views, nicknames, triggers, functions, and packages.  
When a schema is created, its owner may be granted CREATIN, ALTERIN, and DROPIN privileges 
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to be allowed to create objects, alter objects, and drop objects within the schema, respectively. 
Moreover the owner is able to grant any of these privileges to other users.  D-CTP1 in Figure 26 
illustrates this.  For instance, the first predicate in D-CTP1 states that when schema S is created by 
any user, the owner of S is permitted to create objects within S. 
Table 4. Objects and privileges in DB2. 
Objects Privileges 
Schema CREATIN, ALTERIN, DROPIN 
Table CONTROL: DELETE, INSERT, SELECT, UPDATE, ALTER, 
INDEX, REFERENCE; as well as GRANT and REVOKE any 
of these 
View CONTROL: DELETE, INSERT, SELECT, UPDATE; as well 
as GRANT and REVOKE any of these 
Routine EXECUTE 
other objects Other privileges 
 
 
Table 4 also shows that DELETE, INSERT, SELECT, and UPDATE are applicable to both tables 
and views, allowing authorized users to delete, insert, select, and update rows of tables and views, 
respectively. ALTER, INDEX, and REFERENCE are applicable to tables only, and let the authorized 
user add more columns to an existing table, define indices on a table, and create or drop a foreign key 
that references a table, respectively. 
DB2 grants the control of such tables and views to the object creator initially. Users who are 
authorized to control such objects can grant and revoke such privileges to and from other users. D-
CTP2 in Figure 26 illustrates this.  For instance, the first predicate in D-CTP2 states that when user U 
creates table T, U is permitted to control T.  Table 4 and D-CTP3 in Figure 26 state that the privilege 
EXECUTE is initially granted to both PUBLIC and the creator of routines (procedure, function, 
method). 
Furthermore, SYSADM, and DBADM are two DB2 authorities that can execute any privilege at 
the schema and instance level, respectively. They also can grant and revoke all their privileges. 
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However, since such rules are defined independently of the creation of specific objects, they are 
excluded from creation time policies. 
 
 
Figure 26. Creation time policies for DB2. 
5.2.3 Creation Time Policies for the Livelink ECM System 
This section considers Livelink, a product of Open Text Corporation for enterprise content 
management. The system is built over a complex data repository, in which the data space is divided 
into one enterprise workspace and a collection of personal workspaces, one per user. Diverse forms 
of data objects, including documents, tasks, news items, etc., can be stored in the workspaces. Data 
objects may be kept in various kinds of container objects, including folders, discussions, channels, 
and projects.  Moreover, containers can include other containers, forming a complex network of data 
objects that is accessible to individual users and groups of users, depending on their permissions. 
Furthermore, users designated as Admin have all permissions on all objects (cf. Unix’s super-users, as 
explained in Section 5.2.1) and individual users have all permissions on all objects stored in their own 
personal workspaces. All other users may be assigned permissions as individuals or through their 
D-CTP1: 
+schema(S), owner(U)  +permit(U, createin, S). 
+schema(S), owner(U)  +permit(U, alterin, s). 
+schema(S), owner(U)  +permit(U, dropin, S). 
+schema(S), owner(U)  +permit(U, grantcreatein, S). 
+schema(S), owner(U)  +permit(U, grantalterin, S). 
+schema(S), owner(U)  +permit(U, grantdropin, S). 
D-CTP2:  
+table(T), create(U, T)  +permit(U, control, T). 
+view(V), create(U, V)  +permit(U, control, V). 
D-CTP3:  
+routine(R), create(U, R)  +permit(U, execute, R). 
+routine(R), public(PUBLIC)  +permit(PUBLIC, execute, R). 
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membership in a user group, where user groups are structured into an arbitrarily deep, directed acyclic 
graph. Being based on a hierarchical model, each object resides within some container. Like Unix, 
Livelink assumes a three-component structure to implement user permissions, including owner, 
owner group, and public group (which includes all subjects that have “public access” permissions to 
any object). Figure 27 illustrates how creation time policies model initial permissions of each 
component when an object is created. 
 
 
Figure 27. General creation time policies for Livelink’s permissions. 
In general, the creator of an item is the owner of that item, and that user is initially granted the 
permissions held on the container by its owner. The first rule in L-CTP1 illustrates this policy: the 
body of the rule is a conjunction of three application-based predicates, namely item, container, and 
owner; as well as a reserved predicate permit. Predicate item determines whether a new object has 
been created. Predicate container determines whether C is the container of O. Predicate owner has 
two parameters to indicate a subject and an object, respectively, and determines whether the subject is 
the owner of the object. Predicate permit, in the body of the rule, determines permissions of the 
container’s owner.  
Every item is also associated with an owner group, and those group permissions are also initialized 
to be identical to the owner group permissions on the container. This policy is captured by the second 
rule in L-CTP1, in which predicate ownerGroup determines if the first parameter is the owner group 
of the second parameter.  The other predicates function as in the first rule.  
Finally, the public group’s permissions are initialized to match its permissions for the container. 
This policy is captured by the third rule in which predicate publicGroup determines if its parameter is 
the public group.   
L-CTP1: 
+item(O), container(O, C), owner(U,C), permit(U, P,C)  +permit(S, P, O). 
+item(O), container(O, C), ownerGroup(G1,O), ownerGroup(G2,C),  
 permit(G2, P,C)  +permit(G1, P, O). 
+item(O), container(O, C), publicGroup(G), permit(G,P,C)  +permit(G, P, O). 
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In addition to the general creation time policies that are applicable to all object types in Livelink, 
there are several policies applicable to specific object types.  
The most common data items are documents, URLs, workflow maps, aliases, releases, generations, 
and versions. These can be hierarchically organized into folders and compound documents. The 
creator of any of these objects is initially assigned all permissions held by the owner of the container, 
as explained in L-CTP1 in Figure 27. All other users are initially assigned the permissions that they 
have on the container within which the object is created.  This policy is captured by L-CTP2, depicted 
in Figure 28, in which predicate +docs determines if the new created object is from one of the above 
data item types. Recall that L-CTP2 is not a propagation policy as described in Section 5.1: it is 
applicable only when an object is created, and thereafter permissions on either the object or its 
container can be updated without affecting permissions on the other.  
A second type of data item is a project, which can contain any types of data, including other 
projects. Projects, like all other items, have permissions assigned for the owner, owner group, and 
public access, as depicted in Figure 27. Unlike the items described above, however, the assigned 
access list for a project contains exactly three project-specific groups, namely coordinator, guest, and 
member, which act as roles; users and groups are assigned to these roles by making them members of 
these project-specific groups. Permissions are assigned to the three roles as follows: a coordinator has 
all permissions on the project, a guest has permission to see the project, and a member can also see, 
add, modify, or delete objects within the project. These policies are captured by L-CTP3, depicted in 
Figure 28, in which predicates coordinatorRole, guestRole, and memberRole indicate that the first 
parameter is the specific group associated with the object specified as the second parameter to 
represent coordinator, guest, and member roles, respectively. 
When a project is created, the creator is automatically assigned to the coordinator role, and 
coordinators may assign users and groups to any of the three roles or delete them from those roles. 
When a project is created as a sub-project of another one, the coordinator, member, and guest lists are 
copied from the project in which it resides, and the creator is added as an additional coordinator for 




Figure 28. Specific creation time policies for Livelink’s permissions. 
 
L-CTP2:  
+docs(O), container(O, C), permit(S,P,C)  +permit(S, P, O). 
L-CTP3:  
+project(O), coordinatorRole(R,O)  +permit(R,*, O). 
+project(O), guestRole(R,O)  +permit(R, see, O). 
+project(O), memberRole(R,O)  +permit(R, see, O). 
+project(O), memberRole(R,O)  +permit(R, addTo, O). 
+project(O), memberRole(R,O), container(X,O)  +permit(R, delete, X). 
+project(O), memberRole(R,O), container(X,O)  +permit(R, modify, X). 
L-CTP4: 
 +project(O), create(S, O), coordinatorRole(R,O)  +assignRole(S,R). 
+project(O1), container (O1,O2), project(O2), coordinatorRole(R2,O2), 
assignRole(S2,R2), coordinatorRole(R1,O1)  +assignRole(S2,R1). 
+project(O1), container (O1,O2), project(O2), memberRole(R2,O2), assignRole(S2,R2), 
memberRole(R1,O1)  +assignRole(S2,R1). 
+project(O1), container (O1,O2), project(O2), guestRole(R2,O2), assignRole(S2,R2), 
guestRole(R1,O1)  +assignRole(S2,R1). 
L-CTP5: 
+project(O1), container (O1, O2), folder(O2), permit(S2,allPermissions,O2),  
coordinatorRole(R1,O1)  +assignRole(S2,R1). 
+project(O1), container (O1, O2), folder(O2), permit(S2,read,O2),  guestRole(R1,O1)  
+assignRole(S2,R1). 
+project(O1), container(O1,O2), folder(O2), permit(S2,addTo,O2), ¬(permit(S2, 
editAttributes, O2), permit(S2,modifyContents,O2)), memberRole(R1,O1) 
 +assignRole(S2,R1). 
+project(O1), container (O1, O2), folder(O2),¬permit(S2,addTo,O2),  permit(S2, 
editAttributes, O2), permit(S2,modifyContents,O2), memberRole(R1,O1) 
 +assignRole(S2,R1). 




Figure 28 (continued).  Specific creation time policies for Livelink’s permissions. 
In those rules the predicate assignRole indicates that the first parameter (which is a subject) is made 
a subgroup of the second parameter (which represents a role). Also as before, predicate create has 
two parameters to indicate a subject and an object, respectively, and determines whether the subject 
has created the object. 
Alternatively, if a project is created in a folder, subject-role associations are initialized based on the 
permissions that the subjects have on the folder: the project creator and those with all permissions on 
the folder are added to the coordinator list, those with read permission on the folder are added to the 
guest list for the project and those with either add items or both edit attributes and modify contents on 
the folder are added to the member list for the project.  As before, the project creator is assigned to 
the coordinator role by the first rule of L-CTP4. However, the rest of the assignments are captured by 
L-CTP6: 
+workItem(O), create(S, O)  +permit(S ,administer, O). 
+workItem(O), container(O,C), folder(C), permit(X,allPermissions, C)  +permit(X 
,administer, O). 
+workItem(O), container(O,C), folder(C),  
  permit(X,read,C)  +permit(X ,read, O). 
+workItem(O), container(O,C), folder(C), permit(X,addItems, C),  
  ¬ (permit(X, editAttributes, C),  
  permit(X,modifyContents, C))  +permit(X ,write, O). 
+workItem(O), container(O,C), folder(C), permit(X,editAttributes, C),  
  permit(X, modifyContents, C),  
  ¬permit(X, addItems, C)  +permit(X ,write, O). 
+workItem(O), container(O,C), project(C),   
  coordinatorRole(R,C)  +permit(R, administer, O). 
+workItem(O), container(O,C), project(C),  
  guestRole(R,C)  +permit(R, read, O). 
+workItem(O), container(O,C), project(C),   




L-CTP5, depicted in Figure 28, in which predicate folder determines if an object is from the type 
folder, and keyword allPermissions is an abbreviated form of the conjunction of all permissions. 
The third class of data item, called work items, includes channels (sequences of news items), 
discussions (hierarchically nested sequences of topics and replies), and task lists (hierarchically 
nested sequences of tasks). For this class, the individual elements of the work item do not carry 
independent permissions, but instead are governed by the permissions assigned to each work item as a 
whole. For objects in this class, users and groups may be given read permission, write permission, or 
administer permission (which includes grant and revoke permissions as well as all other permissions).  
If a work item is created under a folder, the creator and those with all permissions on the folder are 
assigned administer permission, stated by the first and second rules of L-CTP6 in Figure 28. Those 
with read permission on the folder are assigned read permission on the work item; stated by the third 
rule of L-CTP6.  Finally, those with either add items or both edit attributes and modify contents on 
the folder are assigned write permission on the work item; stated by fourth and fifth rules of L-CTP6. 
Likewise, if an item of this class is created under a project, the coordinator group is given administer 
permission, the guest group is given read permission, and the member group is given write 
permission; stated by the last three rules of L-CTP6. 
5.3 ACAD and the Constraining Mechanism 
The constraining mechanism described in Section 5.1 is the means of initializing the access control 
states in ACAD as well as restricting the possible valid next states. In particular, this mechanism can  
exploit different classes of ACAD access banks (illustrated in Figure 16) to define creation time 
policies (e.g. in public banks, as illustrated in Figure 26). Moreover,  the initial content of omni banks 
(illustrated in Figure 17) is in fact determined by this same mechanism. It is creation time polices that 
define what the initial privileges of owner banks are, whether someone can customize or combine two 
existing banks, and  what privileges are allowed to be imported in such banks. 
5.4 Further Discussion 
This section describes the power of creation time policies to adjust the level of decentralization. As 
shown through Section 5.2, it is important to notice that the creation time policy in ACAD is a 
mechanism to initialize an explicit access control matrix anywhere on the spectrum of access control 
 
 85 
administration. This section highlights the power of this mechanism towards adjusting the amount of 
decentralization anywhere from an autocratic setting to an anarchistic state, by manipulating the 
creation time policies of the motivating example illustrated in Figure 24. 
In particular, the second rule of CTP3 in Figure 24 states that only one set of subjects (who are the 
family member of the patient) can update rows in the explicit access control matrix that correspond to 
specific patients (but only by setting cells of the corresponding column of diagnosis information to 
permission read). We illustrate the following cases to demonstrate the effect of creation time policies.  
(a) If the second rule is removed from CTP3, no one can update the explicit access control matrix 
at all. Consequently, the existing cells of the access matrix will not evolve (only new rows or 
columns may be added to the matrix).   
(b) Now, while the second rule does not exist in CTP3, assume adding the following rule  
+medical_record(M) ^ secutiy_officer(S)  +permit(S, *, M). 
to Figure 24. This simulates a centralized (autocratic) administration model since only the 
security officer is able to update the explicit access control matrix (delegate or revoke rights).  
All other subjects have to channel their update requests through the security officer. 
(c) Alternatively, assume adding the following rule 
 create(S,M)  +permit(S, *, M). 
to Figure 24 (while the second rule does not exist in CTP3). This simulates a user managed 
access control model since whoever creates an object has all of the update rights on it. Unless 
the creaor chooses to grant delegation permissions to others, all other subjects have to 
channel their update requests through the creator. 
(d) Finally, assume adding the following non-safe rule  
+medical_record(M)   +permit(*, *, M). 
to Figure 24. This rule makes the administration model anarchistic since every subject in the 
system is able to update the rights on a medical record.  
5.5 Related Work 
Access control enforcements are traditionally divided into Discretionary Access Control and 
Mandatory Access Control. The former provides predefined (by users) discretionary rules and access 
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control based on users’ identities; the latter controls access based on subjects’ and objects’ 
classifications in a system. In mandatory access control environments, access control rules are 
decided by system policies independently of the owners of objects. Both discretionary and mandatory 
frameworks have been of interest to researchers, and they are supported by many subsequent models. 
Role based access control models also have well investigated in the literature as reviewed in Section 
2.2. This section reviews another work focused on object creation as follows.  
A more specific idea of enforcing security policies at object creation time is shown in the work by  
Zannone et al.. They propose a mechanism to control information flow with a focus on derived 
objects that are dynamically created at run time [Zannone et al. 2006]. Essentially, the authors 
improve the flexible authorization framework [Jajodia et al. 2001] by allowing users to create new 
objects but avoiding Trojan horses. The idea is that a derived object’s authorizations must be a subset 
of the intersection of its original object’s authorizations. The system administrator is warned if a user 
can access a new object o1 while he cannot access a subset of objects from which o1 is derived. It is, 





This chapter represents a formal semantics, defined operationally by a relational model, for the 
ACAD model. Three data catalogues are defined in ACAD, namely SysObjHier, SysBankObj, and 
SysBankSubj, to represent the object hierarchies as well as the bank-object and bank-subject 
assignments, respectively. The assumption is that there are additional relations for all objects 
representing their various attributes, such as object type, creator, etc. To support these catalogues, 
three keywords NoPar, Public, and Sys are defined, where NoPar represents the virtual parent of all 
root objects, Public⊆U represents all subjects in the access control universe (cf. Definition 1), and Sys 
∈ Public is the system subject that is in charge of all automatic operations taken by the system at 
initialization time. 
Table 5(a) illustrates SysObjHier, which represents the information about the object hierarchies 
including the bank and subject hierarchies. This catalogue consists of four attributes, namely T#, 
Child, Parent, and By. In our illustrations, T# ij indicates that the current tuple results from the jth 
operation of the ith transaction. Child and Parent represent the child-parent relationship within the 
object hierarchy. Attribute By, which is from the Public domain, represents which subject has caused 
the tuple. Note that we assume each root vertex is its own parent; moreover, we do not illustrate 
cross-references in our catalogues since they have no influence on the algorithms.  
Table 5(b) illustrates SysBankSubj, the bank-subject assignments, which include four attributes, 
namely T#, Bank, Subject, and Grantor. Again, T# ij indicates that the current tuple is produced by the 
jth operation of the ith transaction. Subject and Bank represent the subjects which hold all permissions 
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designated by authorizations in the bank. Grantor represents who has assigned the subject to the 
bank. 
Table 5(c) illustrates SysBankObj, the bank-object assignments, which include six attributes, 
namely T#, Bank, Object, Operation, Mode and Constraint. T# is as in the other relations. Bank 
represents the bank name. Constraint, Operation, and Object, when Mode is set to “permit”, represent 
the domain of subjects who are eligible to execute the operation on the object within this bank. When 
Mode is set to “deny”, the tuple represents a negative authorization indicating that the permission 
cannot be granted to the object. The conflict resolution strategy determines which authorizations can 
be implicitly obtained by the assigned subjects. 
Table 5. ACAD system catalogues. 
(a) SysObjHier represents object hierarchies. 
T# Child Parent By
c
 
01 b00 b00 Sys 
    
 








03 b00 Creators Sys 
    
 





 Operation Mode Constraint 
02 b00 NoPar createChild permit Public 
      
 
Underlined attributes and superscript letters represent primary and foreign keys of these catalogues, 
respectively. For instance, the primary key of SysBankSubj is the combination of Bank and Subject; 
also, attributes Bank, Subject, and Grantor are foreign keys referencing the key of an object table (not 
illustrated). Moreover, Table 5 depicts the initial state of the catalogues when a new system is 
initialized. T# 0i indicates that the tuple is produced by the initial transaction in the system. Table 5(a) 
illustrates that the system subject, Sys, initially creates bank b00. Tables 5(b) illustrates that Creators ⊆ 
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Public are subjects authorized to create objects, whereas Table 5(c) illustrates that any subset of 
Public can be potentially authorized to create objects. If Creators=Public, i.e. every subject has the 
right to create objects, then there is no constraint at initialization time to be assigned to bank b00; in 
fact, all subjects (Public) are then assigned to b00 and thus authorized to create root objects, children 
of NoPar. The rest of this section specifies the semantics of major access control lookup and update 
requests in our model. 
6.1 The Lookup Requests 
There are two major classes of lookup requests in ACAD, subjectCapabilities and objectAccessList. 
The former is a class of queries by which one can find the access rights for an arbitrary subject (user, 
group, application); and the result, called capabilities, is a list of pairs of objects with the 
corresponding operations for which the subject has permission. Similarly, the latter is a class of 
queries by which one can find the access rights to an arbitrary object (file, directory, group, etc.); and 
the resulting access list is in a list of pairs of subjects with the corresponding operations permitted on 
the object. 
In Chapter 3, we discussed an algorithm to propagate access authorization through hierarchies and 
resolve possible conflicts based on a variety of combined strategies. The algorithm, called Resolve(), 
exploited the explicit access control matrix (called EACM) as well as subject and object hierarchies 
(called SDAG and ODAG) as global variables. Here, in Figure 29, Algorithm 0 represents how such 
variables can be defined using data catalogues depicted in Table 5. In particular, Line 1, in Algorithm 
0, defines relation EACM to express all explicitly authorized (either permitted or stopped) subject-
object-operation triples, by joining catalogues SysBankObj and SysBankSubj where the joint attribute 
is bank. Lines 2 and 3 define relations SDAG and ODAG to represent subjects and objects 
hierarchies, respectively. (Note that only (active) objects that are members of Public are considered as 
subjects in ACAD.)  
Algorithm II in Figure 29 depicts subjectCapabilities. It takes a subject as an input parameter, and 
computes the union of all pairs <o, p> for all objects and all permissions if accessible to the subject. 
Each output pair indicates an operation that the subject is permitted to execute on the corresponding 
object. Algorithm Resolve(), presented in Chapter 3, determines whether or not a given subject can 
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access on object with some permission, based on the current conflict resolution strategy and 
propagation mode.  
Similarly, Algorithm III in Figure 29 depicts objectAccessList. It takes an object as an input 
parameter, and computes the union of all pairs <s, p> for all subjects and all permissions for which it 




Figure 29. Lookup algorithms in ACAD. 
Note that our focus in this chapter is on the semantics of ACAD, and not on the computational 
complexities of the algorithms. However, it is obvious that the worst-case time complexity of 
Algorithm II (and III) is not worse than the one of Algorithm I since we can enhance Algorithm I to 
propagate all pairs of <object, permission> in the same manner as it currently propagates one pair, 

















Algorithm I: Resolve (s1 ∈ Public, o1 ∈ U, p1 ∈ Permissions, pMode ∈ {“pass through”, block by”, 
override”}, dRule ∈ {“+”, “-”, “0”}, lRule ∈ {max(), min(), identity()}, mRule ∈ {“before”, 
“after”, “skip”}, pRule ∈ {“+”, “-”}) 
¤  Cf. Chapter 3, Figure 8 
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with the same worst-case complexity.  Furthermore, the conflict resolution algorithm (Resolve()) can 
be replaced with alternative algorithms that are optimized for a particular strategy or subset of 
strategies to be provided to a customer. 
6.2 The Update Requests 
Figure 30 illustrates eight update methods, namely assignTo, removeFrom, import, addConstraint, 
deleteBank, subscribeTo, unsubscribeTo, and deleteSubject as explained in Section 4.3. To be able to 
call any of these methods, the caller subject must have been granted the applicable permission within 
subjectCapabilites. For simplicity, we omit code to check that update operations are in accordance 
with primary and foreign keys constraints, such as ensuring that duplicates are not inserted into the 
access control tables and references to deleted values are not left dangling. 
Algorithm IV represents method assignTo, which assigns a given subject s∈Public to a given bank 
b∈Banks where views Public⊆U and Banks⊆U represents all subjects and banks in the access control 
universe, respectively. First, subject s must meet all constraints for authorizations in b. Then, a 
corresponding tuple <T(), s, b, caller()> is inserted into SysBankSubj, in which function T() generates 
a new transaction number and function caller() returns the subject who calls method assignTo.  
Algorithm V represents method removeFrom, which removes a given subject s∈Public from a 
given bank b∈Banks. The method removes the tuple corresponding to bank b and subject s from 
SysBankSubj. 
Algorithm VI represents method import, which allows the caller to import any subset of 
authorizations omniRights⊆Authorizations from a given bank source∈Banks to a new bank 
newBank∈Banks. Hence, newBank becomes a child of source in the bank hierarchy by inserting tuple 
<T(), newBank, source, caller()> into SysObjHier where function caller() determines the importer 
subject. Moreover, recall from Section 4.5, the exporter (owner of source) retains control over his 
bank hierarchy by specifying (using parameter omniRights) which authorizations are inserted into the 
customized omnibank of the importer.  
Algorithm VII represents method addConstraint, which excludes subjects from the existing 
constraint of a given permission p∈Permissions of a given bank b∈Banks on a given set of objects 




Figure 30. Update algorithms in ACAD. 
Algorithm IV: assignTo(s∈Public; b∈Banks) 
if s ∈ constraint(b) 
then insert <T(), s, b,  caller()> into SysBankSubj; 
Algorithm V: removeFrom (s∈Public; b∈Banks) 
delete from SysBankSubj where subject=s and bank=b; 
Algorithm VI: import(newBank∈Banks; source∈Banks; omniRights⊆Authorizations) 
insert <T(), newBank, source, caller()> into SysObjHier 
update omni(caller()) with omniRights; 











=Π∈ σ   
then  
update SysBankObj set constraint=constraint-{s} and t# = T() 
where bank=b and object=o and operation=p and mode=permit; 
delete from SysBankSubj where subject = s and bank=b; 
addConstraint(children(b), o, p, s); 
Algorithm VIII: deleteBank (b∈Banks) 
Pre: l has no child 
delete from SysBankSubj where bank=b; 
delete from SysBankObj where bank=b or object=b; 
delete from SysObjHier  where child=b; 
Algorithm IX: subscribeTo (member∈Public; group∈Public) 
insert <T(), member, group, caller()> into SysObjHier; 
Algorithm X: unsubscribeFrom(member∈Public; group∈Public) 
delete from SysObjHier where child=member and parent=group; 
Algorithm XI: deleteSubject (s∈Public) 
Pre: s has no child 
delete from SysBankSubj where subject=s; 
delete from SysBankObj where object=s; 
delete from SysObjHier  where child=s; 
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as explained in Algorithm IV. First, if s does not intersect the existing constraint, the algorithm 
terminates; otherwise, the corresponding tuples <_, b, o, p, permit, Constraint> in SysBankObj are 
replaced by new ones <T(), b, o, p, permit, Constraint-{s}>, in which function T() generates a new 
transaction number. Calling this method may revoke bank b and its descendants from some subjects.  
Therefore, the corresponding tuples for subject s in s are removed from SysBankSubj. Finally, the 
algorithm is cascaded to the descendants in order that their constraints remain contained within the 
revised constraints in the ancestor (as required by Definition 11). Note that the method is applicable 
to permission authorizations only, not to stoppers. 
Algorithm VIII represents method deleteBank, which deletes a leaf bank b∈Banks from the bank 
hierarchy. Calling this method removes all corresponding bank-subject assignments from 
SysBankSubj, all corresponding bank-object assignments from SysBankObj, all tuples in which b is 
treated as an object from SysBankObj, and all incident edges for vertex b from SysObjHier.  
Algorithm IX represents method subscribeTo, which includes a given subject member∈Public in a 
given subject group∈Public. The corresponding tuple <T(), member, group, caller()> is inserted into 
SysObjHier in which functions T() and caller() are as in Algorithm IV. 
Algorithm X represents method unsubscribeFrom, which removes a given subject 
member∈Public from a given subject group∈Public. The method removes the tuple corresponding to 
member and group from SysObjHier. 
Algorithm XI represents method deleteSubject, which deletes a leaf subject s∈Public from the subject 
hierarchy. Calling this method removes all corresponding bank-subject assignments from 
SysBankSubj, all tuples in which s is treated as an object from SysBankObj, and all incident edges for 
vertex s from SysObjHier. 
6.3 Object Creation 
When a new object is created, one or more corresponding tuples are inserted into the catalogue 
SysObjHier to represent the object and its parent(s). (Recall, in ACAD,  each object is its own parent 
too.) Furthermore, zero or more update requests (depicted in Figure 30) are automatically triggered 
based on the creation time policies (discussed in Chapter 5). As depicted in Figure 23, any of the ten 
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types of reserved predicates explained in Section 4.3 may be triggered in a creation time policy. The 
explanation of each case is as follows: 
Predicate permit (or deny) causes a root bank to be created by Sys; consequently, one tuple is 
inserted into catalogue SysObjHier and several tuples are inserted into catalogues SysBankObj and 
SysBankSubj (at least one each), to represent the bank, its authorization(s), as well as the 
corresponding object and subject assignments.  
Predicates subscribeTo and unsubscribeFrom cause an update to the subject hierarchy, which either 
insert tuples to (or delete from) catalogue SysObjHier, to represent the group subscription and 
unsubscription, respectively. Similarly, predicate deleteSubject causes one or more deletions from 
catalogue SysObjHier, to represent deletion of a leaf subject and removing corresponding edges from 
its parents.  
Predicates assignTo and removeFrom cause an update to the subject-bank assignments, which 
either insert or delete tuple(s) from catalogue SysBankSubj to represent the simple delegation and 
revocation, respectively. Note that assignTo must first ensure that the subject meets the constraint. 
Predicate import causes a child bank of an existing bank to be created by Sys; several tuples are 
inserted into catalogues SysObjHier, SysBankObj and SysBankSubj, to represent the bank, its 
parents, its authorization(s), as well as the corresponding object and subject assignments. Recall that  
import is the means of enhanced delegation in ACAD, explained in Section 4.5.3. 
Recall also that addConstraint is the means of strong revocation, explained in Section 4.5.5. 
Predicate addConstraint causes an update to Catalogue SysBankObj; the update is limited to further 
constrain the constraints attribute of an existing tuple. This may also cause several other updates for 
the tuples associated with the descendants of the constraining bank as well as deleting some tuples 
form SysBankSubj to remove subjects who no longer meet the new constraint. 
Finally, predicate deleteBank causes one or more deletion from catalogue SysObjHier, to represent 
deletion of a leaf bank and removing corresponding edges from its parents. 
6.4 Related Work 
The idea of defining the ACAD semantics operationally by a relational model has been inspired by 
the paper by Bertino et al. describing authorization model for relational databases [Bertino et al. 
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1999]. They have defined four relational catalogues to represent privilege-table (or view) 
assignments, subject-privilege assignments, subjects’ ancestors, and subjects’ parents relationships. It 
is clear that the ancestor relationship can be derived from the parent relationship; however the authors 
decided to materialize it for implementation efficiency. Note that they do not have to worry about the 
object hierarchy since DB2 tables are independent from each other (they use views mostly for 
content-dependent authorizations). However, in ACAD, relying on the fact that everything is 
essentially an object, all subject, object, and bank hierarchies are represented in one catalogue 
(SysObjHier). Moreover, the implementation choices of the ancestor relationship, which is computed 
by deriving reachable nodes for each hierarchy, remains intentionally open to users for flexibility in 




USER MANAGED ACCESS CONTROL 
Chapters 3 through 5 describe the mechanism to specify access control administration, which is called 
ACAD. This chapter provides an illustrative example in which  ACAD is applied to define a User 
Managed Access Control (UMAC) system (through the motivating example of healthcare 
applications, introduced in Section 1.3). In particular, in UMAC, subjects fully manage the formation 
of groups, the structure of objects, and the expansion of  access banks as well as the assignment of 
authorizations, without interfering with one another and without requiring a centralized 
administration to update the access control structure. Section 7.1 introduces the UMAC specification. 
Section 7.2 illustrates UMAC by a use case of healthcare systems. Section 7.3 proves how users can 
retain control in UMAC. Finally, Section 7.4 reviews related literature. 
7.1 Specification 
Recall from Chapter 1, access control models form a spectrum of autocratic to self-governing 
administrations. UMAC fits at the latter end. There are various types of self-governing systems, such 
as systems in which every object creator is the object owner (for example, web-based file sharing 
systems), systems in which owners are defined at configuration time (for example, corporate 
applications), etc.  
UMAC is a self-governing system, in which some subjects who create objects are considered as 
owners whereas some other creators may act as agents or employees of the object owner. At creation 
time, some subject is designated as owner and initially receives all permissions on the created object. 
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Creation time policies may additionally grant initial permissions to other users as well. Propagation of 
permissions uses the stopper form of denial. Therefore, in UMAC, each subject may possess two 
faces: the administrator of its own objects, and at the same time, a user of others’ objects. With their 
administration face, subjects require full access control over their own objects, but as users they are 
typically licensed to more limited levels of access.  
User managed access control becomes complicated when the hierarchy of subjects is not consistent 
with the hierarchy of objects. In other words, subjects (e.g. technicians in the healthcare application) 
may have access to many small parts of objects (their patients’ relevant personal data). Moreover, 
accessible domains of various subjects form diverse structures that should be recognized for 
optimization purposes. For instance, a physician’s accessible data mainly consists of a collection of 
disconnected nodes each of which corresponds to a particular patient treated in various clinics; while, 
a technician’s accessible data is basically medical data of patients treated in a particular laboratory. 
Definition 12 (Principle of Non-interference). “One group of users, using a certain set of 
commands, is not interfering with another group of users if what the first group does with those 
commands has no effect on what the second group of users can see” [Goguen and Meseguer 1983]. 
Goguen and Meseguer defined the principle of non-interference by which subjects are prevented 
from certain interference activities that violate some security policies. Notice that this approach 
avoids a transitive-closure computation which generally exists in verifying security by determining 
which subjects potentially can interfere with others. 
ACAD’s features provide the flexibility of defining a UMAC model. For instance, the generic and 
customized banks (introduced in Section 4.2.) can be applied towards the self-governance property 
explained in Chapter 1. In particular, there is no administrative superiority in Figures 16 (a) or (b) 
since neither S1 nor S2 can disrupt the other’s actions, and there is no centralized control.  
7.2 Use Case: Healthcare Systems 
This section illustrates the UMAC model through a more concrete instance of Example I. This 
application has been initially inspired from the XACML use cases [Kudo 2001]; however, we have 
adapted it to reflect a more decentralized application environment [Chinaei and Tompa 2005]. Figure 
31 illustrates the schema of a typical medical record, which consists of one element of patient 
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information and zero or more elements of encounter. An encounter consists of elements 
hospitalization information, diagnosis information, and possibly completed consent form. Each 
element of diagnosis information contains zero or more elements of therapy information. A medical 
record may be accessed by different subjects such as doctors, patients, receptionists, accounting 
system, etc. Each subject should be authorized to have only the minimal privileges it needs. Here, the 
functions of UMAC are briefly described based on the following scenario that focuses on both 
efficiency and self-governance. 
 
Figure 31. An  example of medical records schema. 
The scenario assumes an instance of the system is installed for St. Mary’s hospital. The hospital is 
the owner of medical records; however, various users of the system, such as patients or caregivers, 
may create elements of a medical record (such as personal data, hospitalization information, and 
diagnoses). Moreover, groups of users and their job functions may be defined when the system is 
initialized. For instance, assume group Patients is created and assigned to bank predefined1 which 
includes an import authorization that allows importers to create the element patient_info within 
medical records. Similarly, assume groups Receptionists and Doctors are created, and their members 
are able to create sub-elements hospitalization_info and diagnosis_info, respectively, by exploiting 
corresponding banks predefined2 and predefined3. Furthermore, all users are assigned to a predefined 
bank which includes authorization <C, permit, subscribeTo, Patients> by which they can subscribe 
themselves to group Patients when they need to see a doctor.  
This use case represents the application of different classes of access banks, explained in Section 
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Assume Patricia becomes a member of Patients. Therefore, through predefined1, she can create an 
element in the St. Mary’s hierarchy to contain her personal information. When she does so, as part of 
the hospital’s check-in procedure, she is directed to create banks b1 and b2, and to assign receptionists 
of St. Mary’s Hospital to b2. Figure 32, which combines aspects of Figures 20 and 22, illustrates this. 
Note the use of delegation by agents and enhanced delegation. Moreover, as a part of the check-in 
procedure, a family member of the patient is assigned to a generic bank genBank4, by which they are 
able to create the consent. 
 
 
Figure 32. A new patient arrives in a healthcare system. 
 
Figure 33. A doctor attends the patient. 
Then, assume Robert, who is a member of the Receptionists group, and thus inherits the 




diagnosis_info <C3-Patricia, permit, read, diagnosis_info> 













hospitalization information (such as room number and arrival date), and also uses the grant 
permission in b2 to assign the group Doctors to b1 (not diagrammed). Then, as illustrated in Figure 33, 
doctor Dorothy attends to Patricia, and creates her diagnosis information by exploiting bank 
predefined3. Dorothy also creates banks b3 and b4, and as the doctor in charge, assigns Doctors and 
Nurses to b4 so that they can delegate the permission to themselves or to others to read Patricia’s 
diagnosis information. However, she excludes Patricia using the constraint of b3 to prevent her from 
reading her own diagnosis information even if she is a doctor or nurse (unless she is granted 
permission through another route). 
 
Figure 34. The patient is permitted to see her diagnosis information. 
Figure 34 illustrates that St. Mary’s can create a new bank b5 that imports from omni1 and include a 
read authorization with grant option, and assign Fred, a member of Patricia’s family, to it upon 
creating the informed consent by him. Therefore, Fred can use the enhanced delegation mechanism to 
create bank b6 and assigns Patricia to it in order to permit her to read her diagnosis information. 
Figure 35 combines Figures 32 to 34 and depicts the complete medical record for Patricia. For 
readability, details of Figures 32 to 34 are not depicted in Figure 35; for instance, Figure 35 does not 
illustrate access banks’ constraints. Moreover, authorizations are shown by abbreviated symbols R, 
R+, and R*, which represent permission read, simple delegation of permission read, and enhanced 
delegation of permission read,  respectively. For instance, R+ in bank b2 means subjects assigned to 
b2 (e.g. receptionists) are allowed to assign other subjects (e.g. doctors) to bank b1, which permits 
them to read Patricia’s personal information. Dotted boundaries highlight the domains within which 
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creators’ capabilities are defined by creation time policies. For instance, if the policy states that 
doctors have all capabilities on the diagnosis information that they create, then Dorothy’s connections 
to banks b3 and b4 will be from her omni bank instead of from the customized omnibank.  
This example shows how corporate policy can allow various subjects such as patients, 
receptionists, doctors, and patient family to administer access control over different parts of a medical 
record. Every time an item of data is created, a corresponding owner bank with all methods is 
automatically created or updated. As an example of a combined role, Fred can create one combined 
bank on several diagnoses and assign Patricia to see them all. As an example of selective revocation, 
Dorothy prevents Patricia from seeing her own record by excluding her in the constraint component 
of bank b3. St Mary’s can prevent Fred and others assigned to role b5 or its descendents (b6) from 
reading the diagnosis information by removing the connection between the omnibank and b5; the read 
permission will no longer be inherited. 
 
Figure 35. All authorizations on the patient medical record. 
One may extend this example in many directions. For instance, since St. Mary’s has control over a 
sub-graph of Dorothy’s bank hierarchy rooted at the customized omnibank omni3
1
, the hospital 
authority can selectively revoke bank b4 from some or all nurses. In a worldwide application 
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including many hospitals in the system, a patient may create sub-elements and assign permissions for 
various hospitals and a doctor may cooperate with several clinics. Thus, Patricia (and Dorothy) may 
have several customized omnibanks, each controlled by a different hospital. However, St Mary’s has 





) only, and cannot interfere with the banks of other hospitals. With such an approach, 
hospitals, and their users, can share their information based on corporate policy agreements. 
7.3 Proof of Retaining Control 
Theorem. Assume subject S1 owns object d and delegates any subset of its authorizations with respect 
to d to any other subjects through a customized bank of its bank hierarchy G. S1 is able to strongly 
revoke any given authorization a operating on object d from any given subject S2 by removing S2 
from the corresponding constraint of omnibank b0.  
PROOF (by contradiction). Assume S1 is not able to revoke authorization a from S2. Because S1 owns 
object d, all authorizations for d are initially placed in S1’s omnibank or in banks in the hierarchy 
rooted at that omnibank and nowhere else. Any of those authorizations can appear in other banks only 
through the import operation, which always creates the new bank as a descendent of the exporting 
bank. Therefore, there is a customized bank b1 in G (rooted at S1’s omnibank) by which S2 enjoys 
authorization a. There are only two cases then: either b1 is not a descendent of b0 which contradicts 
the definition of an omnibank; or, b1 is a descendent of b0 but the constraint of authorization a in b1 is 
not a subset of the corresponding constraint in b0, which contradicts the definition of an access bank. 
Therefore, S1 is able to revoke any given authorization a from any given subject S2.        
Corollary 1. Any subject assigned to an omnibank o is able to strongly revoke any  authorization 
operating on any object associated with o from any given subject S by removing S from the 
corresponding constraint of o.  
Corollary 2. Any subject S1 who is authorized to add more constraints to a fertile bank f is able to 
revoke any authorization a delegated to S2 via any descendant of f by removing S2 from the 
corresponding constraint of f.  
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7.4 Related Work 
The user managed access control model explained in this chapter is distinguished from other 
proposals by its unique property of self-governance (no designated administrator in the system). In 
fact, from UMAC’s point of view all users are in a flat administrative level with no superiority over 
one another, whereas other proposals often assume a hierarchical administration in the system in 
which some subjects have administrative superiority with respect to other subjects [Moffett 1990; 
Firozabadi et al. 2001]. Moffett proposes the idea of administrative domains, each of which has an 
administrator to update the metadata. The whole system is considered as a major domain with a super 
administrator who controls other administrators. This idea has been exploited by other researchers to 
propose a variety of hierarchical administrations; see Sections 2.2 and 2.3. Firozabadi et al. improve 
the idea of administrative domain with two major contributions: adding constrained delegation and 
basing the model on the cryptography approaches rather than identity-based access control lists. The 
former enriched the model by controlling the domain of grantees. The latter modified the model to be 
based on public keys rather than identities. UMAC is very different from such models since it does 
not necessarily require domains. 
UMAC is also different from the proposals that enhance the RBAC model for non-centralized 
environments [Wedde and Lischka 2003; Park and Hwang 2003]. As opposed to UMAC, none of 
these propose a flat administration. In Cooperative Role-Based Administration  [Wedde and Lischka 
2003], the authors propose local Authorization Teams who exercise access control on a set of disjoint 
organizational units; called an Authorization Sphere. They adapt Petri Nets to implement quorum and 
veto features for granting rights from owners to users. Members of an Authorization Team may 
jointly modify the set of rules of their authorization sphere. An inheritance principle is applied based 
on hierarchical relationships between Authorization Spheres. Park and Hwang introduce a three level 
access policy for a peer-to-peer architecture [Park and Hwang 2003]. Each peer makes the access 
control decision based on the enterprise, the community, and the peer policies locally. Since different 
roles may have the same privileges, or conversely, roles with a common name but in different 
communities may define different privileges, the authors assume a function called Role Ontology, 
which determines similar roles in different communities. In this way, the authors propose a 
centralized administration for User-Role assignments, but support decentralized Permission-Role 




COMPARISON OF MODELS 
This chapter highlights our contributions by comparing ACAD to four other noteworthy models, so 
called AFS, FARDMS, FAF, and Ponder, all of which have been well cited in the literature of access 
control.  AFS is the security model for the Andrew File System proposed by Howard et al. [Howard 
et. 1988]. FARDMS, Flexible Authorization Model for Relational Databases Management Systems, 
proposed by Bertino et al. [Bertino et al. 1999] extends the System R model by supporting access 
control exceptions and strong enforcement. FAF  [Jajodia et al 2001] is a specification language to 
support various access control policies in a system. Ponder is a declarative policy specification 
language for management and security of distributed network systems proposed by Damianou et al. 
[Damianou et al. 2001]. Further information about each model is given in Sections 8.1 and 8.2.  
8.1 Desirable Features 
This section undertakes an overview of various access control features. These features have been 
partially inspired from existing models [Bertino et al. 1999; Tolone et al. 2005]. We also define 
several complementary features by studying new enterprises. In particular, we review the overarching 
feature (defined in Section 4.1) that dominates the entire model; and, we divide other features into 
four categories: functional, administration, security, and performance requirements, based on which 
ACAD is comparrd to AFS, FARDMS, FAF, and Ponder. The comparison is illustrated in Table 6. 
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8.1.1 Overarching Requirement 
ACAD is based on one single model in which subjects, banks and objects are treated uniformly, that 
is, data and metadata are treated with the same security model. However, none of AFS, FARDMS, 
FAF, or Ponder support the overarching requirement. AFS provides two hierarchies: one for users and 
groups and another for files and directories, which are controlled by different security models. 
FARDMS provides three hierarchies for subjects, roles, and objects, and each is controlled 
differently. Moreover, the models for administrative privileges and ordinary ones differ. For instance, 
FARDMS concept of strong or weak privileges does not apply to its administrative privileges. 
Therefore, FARDMS fails in providing a uniform model. FAF defines three, similar yet differently 
administered, hierarchies for users, objects, and sets of privileges (called roles in the current version). 
In particular, FAF defines several predicates to represent authorizations, but it does not specify how 
subjects or objects are represented in the authorization system. As an immediate shortcoming, the 
materialized views suggested to represent the authorizations, based on the assumption of more 
frequent access requests with respect to update requests, becomes inefficient in the case of frequent 
updates in users or objects hierarchies. Ponder does not address the data representation of its 
authorizations, subjects, or targets, because it focuses on the policy specification language.  
8.1.2 Functionality 
Functional features express operational expectations that are desired from access control models in 
practical applications. There are four functional features such as support for both closed and open 
policies, granularity, support for exceptions within hierarchies, and support for contextual 
information.  
— Support for both Closed and Open Policies: A closed access control system exploits the 
principle that subjects have no access to an object unless corresponding positive access 
authorizations exist. Similarly, an open access control system states that subjects have access to 
objects in the absence of negative access authorizations. Thus, closed systems minimize 
authorization while open systems maximize it. Access control models should be able to 
implement either assumption properly since both are common in practical applications.  
AFS implements a closed policy only, and FARDMS can simulate a restricted open policy 
that does not support exceptions, whereas FAF and Ponder can easily support an open policy 
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with exceptions by interpreting permissions negatively. Since the conflict resolution 
component is not hardwired to the rest of the model, applying various policies (including the 
open policy) is straightforward in ACAD. 
— Granularity: Data often form hierarchical structures, e.g. user groups and their members or 
relational tables and their tuples; hence, defining access controls on higher levels of hierarchies 
and propagating them down to other levels is a space-saving technique as well as providing 
convenience to users who can simply specify many related authorizations. In contrast, finer 
grained access control is an important functional characteristic even though it is space 
consuming. There are many applications in which access control rules are to be defined for a 
specific individual rather than for a group of users and/or on parts of objects rather than on the 
whole object. Access control models should support various levels of granularity based on the 
application needs. 
The granularity of AFS is very coarse. Access permissions are defined on a whole directory 
rather than a specific file in order to retain conceptual simplicity and storage efficiency. 
FARDMS provides a finer granularity, at the relation level, as well as supporting views. 
However, the view access level is restricted to positive privileges only. ACAD, similar to 
Ponder, provides a fine-grained access control at any level of objects. Both FARDMS and 
Ponder are restricted to coarse granularity with respect to administrative privileges that are 
inseparable. However, ACAD also unbundles authorizations, since no permission is dependent 
on another. For instance, a revocation right (such as removeFrom) does not require holding any 
delegation ability (such as assignTo). FAF is as fine-grained as ACAD. 
— Support for Exceptions within Hierarchies: This feature is important for applications in which 
not all access control policies are defined by general rules and exceptions are inevitable. 
Although often an authorization should be propagated down to the leaves in the hierarchy, there 
are situations in which propagation should be stopped somewhere before reaching the leaves. 
Access control models that do not support exceptions are both inconvenient and more space 
consuming since more fine-grained authorizations must be explicitly defined in such cases. 
All models include both negative and positive privileges in order to support exceptions. Yet, this is 
limited in AFS and FARDMS. AFS supports one level of exception only, in which a subdirectory 
may be accessible to some users as opposed to its inaccessible parent; however, it is impossible in 
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AFS to permit a subfolder to be accessible to any user when its parent is inaccessible to the same 
user. Similarly, in FARDMS, it is meaningless for a view to be inaccessible to a subject while its base 
table is accessible to the same subject. There are no such limitations in FAF, Ponder, or ACAD, 
where exceptions are possible anywhere in the hierarchies. 
8.1.3 Administration 
This section compares the models based on the features that pertain to administering access control. 
Enterprises require sophisticated administration features such as support for manipulating hierarchies, 
the effective timing of access control, delegation and revocation, and implementing various policies. 
Flexible administration features allow access control to be adjustable to various degrees of 
(de)centralization. In contrast, models that do not provide such features are only applicable to limited 
situations e.g. to mandatory access control policies or to applications that have a fixed body of 
administration (no delegation or revocation in the system). 
— Support for Updating Data Hierarchies: Access control models should provide update 
authorizations for manipulating hierarchies, e.g. defining new user groups or adding new 
attributes to XML elements. Models that do not support such update authorizations separate 
data administration from data usage; consequently, these models cover limited applications. 
AFS does not allow users to create their own groups. FARDMS only allows privileged 
subjects to update the subject or object hierarchy. Neither FAF nor Ponder discuss updates of 
the subject hierarchy.  In the FAF formalism, the authors explicitly state that the subjects, 
objects, and roles are disjoint sets. Moreover, no subject can be treated like an object in the 
formalism of FAF authorizations; the object component is from the object domain only. 
Therefore, manipulating the object hierarchy differs from manipulating the subject hierarchy. 
Ponder states that the target of an authorization can be network resources or service providers. 
Ponder allows the definition of role hierarchy and management structures at configuration 
time, however, it does not specify whether or not they are updatable. In general, these 
proposals assume that access requests are far more frequent than update requests, while ACAD 
does not rely on that assumption. ACAD allows subjects to update hierarchies. Moreover, 
updating hierarchies can be centralized or decentralized. Decentralized hierarchy update 
provided by ACAD has at least two advantages: simpler administration and self-governance. 
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— Active/Passive Mechanism: Users, objects, and authorizations change within the system 
lifetime. Changes can take effect either immediately or at a suitable breakpoint depending on 
the application. For instance, if a user subscribes to a group, all group access authorizations can 
be granted to him either immediately or at the next sign in time. The former is called active 
while the latter is passive. Access control models should be able to control the timing of these 
effects. 
Changes in AFS take effect immediately because they are hard wired to the state of the 
operating system. Similarly, changes in Ponder take effect immediately because Ponder is an 
event-driven language in which authorizations are triggered as soon as certain events happen. 
In contrast, FAF has to postpone changes to take effect at a suitable breakpoint since 
authorizations are represented by materialized views in which update is an expensive operation. 
FARDMS and ACAD can support both active and passive mechanisms since these models are 
not tied to the implementation. 
— Delegation and Revocation: Users often need to transfer or extend their responsibilities and 
authorizations to other users. In contrast, sometimes they need to revoke a specific authorization 
from other subjects. Models with no flexible delegation or selective revocation features are not 
suitable for most discretionary access control systems.  
AFS provides a limited level of delegation in which only owners can grant privileges to 
others. Similarly, Ponder supports one level of delegation, in which the network administrator 
can delegate actions to domain administrators. FAF also allows only a single central 
administrator to delegate or revoke privileges. Consequently, cascading revocation is not 
meaningful in the AFS, Ponder, or FAF systems. FARDMS provides a richer delegation 
mechanism by which further delegation is allowed; however, it requires that a subject must 
hold a permission in order to delegate it. Moreover, administrative privileges are an atomic 
package that the owner delegates either as a whole or not at all. Selectively revoking 
permissions from a grantee in the middle of a delegation path is not supported in FARDMS. On 
the other hand, the delegation and revocation mechanisms are at the core of ACAD: a single 
authorization can be delegated to others with or without further delegation option, revocation 
authorization is independent from delegation, and selective revocation is well supported. 
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— Policy Neutral: Access control models should not impose any particular access control policy; 
otherwise, their applicability is limited. For example, the Bell-LaPadula model imposes a 
mandatory access control policy, which is appropriate for specific applications. Other models 
might depend on the existence of “super-users”. Expressive models are policy neutral, leaving it 
to enterprise administrators to specify their own policy at configuration time.  
In AFS and FARDMS, the propagation and conflict resolution polices are hard wired to the 
rest of system, whereas in FAF, Ponder and ACAD, it can be replaced with any arbitrary 
policy.   
— Flexibility: The flexibility of access control models is the characteristic of supporting various 
degrees of restriction. The setup of an access control system could be different even in two 
instances of the same application. For instance, one healthcare system may authorize doctors to 
read patients medical histories by default and another system may not. Access control models 
that do not cover a wide variety of needs cannot be widely applicable.  
In contrast to all other models, ACAD is novel in support of various levels of administration 
to support systems from the autocratic end to self-governed (and even anarchistic) end of the 
spectrum of access control policies. This flexibility is elaborated in Section 8.2. 
8.1.4 Performance 
This section concludes the comparison based on scalability. 
— Scalability: Many access control applications deal with many objects. Furthermore, applications 
usually grow over time. Hence, the scalability of access control component of such applications 
is extremely important. 
AFS and Ponder target large distributed systems. Therefore, the systems chose to be 
restricted for the sake of efficiency. On the other hand, FARDMS is restricted with respect to 
scalability in practice due to providing different security models for different hierarchies as 
well as separating administrative privileges from ordinary ones. We believe FAF scalability is 
fairly limited due to a possible bottleneck for the single central administrator as well as not 
being tied to implementation of its authorization predicates by materialized view. These 
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limitations have been avoided in ACAD by meeting the overarching requirement, providing 
adjustable level of decentralization, and being independent from implementation choices. 
Table 6 summarizes the result of this comparison. In summary, ACAD is distinguished from all 
other four models in five features namely, support of overarching requirement, support for updating 
data hierarchies, expressive delegation mechanism, support for selective revocation, and 
administrative flexibilities.  
Table 6. Comparison of existing models w.r.t. major requirements 
 AFS FARDMS FAF Ponder ACAD 
Overarching 
Req. 









possible possible possible 
Granularity very coarse coarse very fine fine very fine 
Exceptions limited limited no-limit no-limit no-limit 
Update 
Hierarchies 






Active/Passive active both possible passive  active both possible 





















Policy Neutral no no yes yes yes 
Administrative 
Flexibility 
very limited limited very limited limited flexible 
Scalability good limited limited good good 
 
There are other features that can be considered for the evaluation of access control models, such as 
supporting contextual information, understandability, usability, complexity, and security properties. 
However,  we do not discuss such features here due to their lack of influence on the result of the 
comparison. In particular, all the above systems can be extended to support contextual information; 
also, discussion on understandability and usability imposes subjective opinions; and, theoretically 
provable criteria, such as complexity and security properties have not been extensively measured in 
any of the systems.  
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8.2 Access Control Space 
This section brings together creation time policies and conflict resolution policies (introduced in 
Chapters 5 and 3, respectively) to introduce the access control space. Creation time policies are our 
means of initializing the explicit access control matrix to support a comprehensive spectrum of 
administration models, from the autocratic end to the self-governed end.  Conflict resolution policies 
are essential to models that propagate authorizations within hierarchies or support both negative and 
positive authorizations. As an analogy, creation time policies represent the access control  
initializations for a network of access control states, similar to a finite state automaton, whereas 
conflict resolution policies provide different interpretations for each state. In ACAD, all reachable 
states as well as their interpretation conform to the access control policy chosen by the enterprise. 
Figure 36 represents such a space, in which one axis maps the creation time policies 
(Administration) and the other maps the conflict resolution policies (Interpretation).  For the sake of 
comparison, we partition the Administration axis to represent five classes of models with respect to 
the amount of administrative decentralization, namely no admin, single admin, group admin, 
hierarchical admin, and user admin. Systems in which there are no metadata updates and each 
component authority is fixed in the life cycle are from the no admin  class. The 4D1-IRIX operating 
system, in which only one user is allowed to update some data, is an example of the single admin 
class.  Similarly, UNIX, in which a group of users may take the role of super-user, is from the group 
admin class. Role-based access control models, in which roles often map the organizational hierarchy, 
are from the hierarchical admin class. Finally, user-managed access control models (introduced in 
Chapter 7), in which each user potentially can administer various parts of the system, are from the 
user admin class. For simplicity of discussion, we identify the administration classes with numbers 0, 
1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. It is important to notice the higher the number is, the more flexible class it 
represents. Hence, models in class 0 (no admin) can be described by models in class 1 (single admin), 
and so on.  
Similarly, we partition the Interpretation axis to represent four levels of models with respect to the 
flexibility of the conflict resolution component, namely 0 rule, 1 rule, 2 rules, and 2+ rules. Level 0 
rule represents access control models in which conflicts are not possible or allowed; an error is raised 
in the latter case. Level 1 rule represents access control models in which conflicts are resolved by one 
rule only for instance negative-takes-precedence. Level 2 rules represents models in which conflicts 
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are resolved by two rules, for instance the-most-specific-takes-precedence and if there is still a 
conflict then positive-takes-precedence. Level 2+ rules represents models in which the conflict 
resolution component is not hard wired to the system and can be replaced by any conflict resolution 
strategy. Similar to the administration classes, we identify the interpretation levels with numbers 0, 1, 
2, and 3, respectively; and, the higher the level is, the more variety of interpretations it represents. 
Hence, models with rank 0 ( no conflict resolution) can be described by models with rank 1 (resolving 
conflicts by 1 rule), and so on. 
 
      
2+ Rules 
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1 Rule 
     
0 Rule 











Figure 36. Space of access control administration models. 
We suggest to represent the expressivity of each model by a pair of <class, level>, where the class 
identifies the model administrative capabilities and the level identifies its support of variety of 
conflict resolution strategies. Therefore, the space of access control administration models provides a 
visualized mechanism to compare existing models, and leads to a better understanding of their 
functionalities as well as highlighting their overlaps and  differences.    
Figure 37 illustrates the position of AFS, FARDMS, FAF, Ponder, and ACAD within the access 
control space. In terms of administrative capabilities, AFS and FAF are in the administrative Class 1 
since they allow only one user to be the security administrator. However, it is clear that both models 
can be extended to support a group of users, with equal capabilities, and therefore be in Class 2. 
FARDMS is in the administrative class 2 since it currently supports a group of privileged subjects to 
take administrative capabilities. Ponder, in Class 3, provides a more general administrative model, 
with respect to previous models, since it supports a hierarchical  administration, for instance 






administration models cannot express graph-based administration models such as the user managed 
access control model supported by ACAD in Chapter 7. Therefore, ACAD, in Class 4, is the most 
flexible model with respect to other existing models. In terms of interpretation variety, AFS is in level 
1 since it supports a single rule of negative-takes-precedence. FARDMS is richer than AFS since it 
supports the combination of two rules, the most-specific-takes-precedence and negative-takes-
precedence, and is in level 2 then. Moreover, the conflict resolution component in both AFS and 
FARDMS is hard wired to the rest of model, which cause support of different strategies difficult. 
However, FAF, Ponder, and ACAD are all in level 3, which reflects that they are independent from 
the conflict resolution component. FAF, and Ponder explicitly support any combination of three rules 
of the-most-specific-takes-precedence, negative-takes-precedence, and positive-takes-precedence, 
which is equivalent to two strategy instances. ACAD explicitly supports four rules of locality, 
majority, default and preferred authorizations, which covers 48 conflict resolution strategies 







Figure 37. Comparison of the models in access control space. 
 
In summary, the expressivity of AFS, FARDMS, FAF, Ponder, and ACAD can be represented by 
<1,1>, <2,2>, <1,3>, <3,3>, and <4,3>, respectively. Considering the fact that AFS and FAF are 
simply extensible to <2,1> and <2,3>, respectively, one can easily conclude that, in terms of 
administrative capabilities, these models obey the following rule  













in which < means “can be captured by”. This is illustrated by Venn diagram in Figure 38. Moreover, 
ACAD is novel in providing mechanisms to set up the system with the desired level of 
decentralization for each object type and suitable conflict resolution strategy, at configuration time. 
 
Figure 38. Expressivity of the models in access control space. 
8.3 Related Work 
There are two recent papers addressing the requirements of access control models [Bertino et al. 
1999; Tolone et al. 2005]. Bertino et al., in their authorization proposal for relational databases 
systems, discuss several protection requirements among which the following influenced this thesis: 
support for exceptions and strong enforcement, possibility of delegation and retaining control, and 
support for grouping subjects. Tolone et al. summarize several access control requirements, addressed 
by different groups in earlier works [Edwards 1996; Jaeger and Prakash 1996; Ferraiolo and Barkley 
1997; Bullock 1998], in their proposal for collaboration systems, among which the followings 
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter first summarizes the contributions of ACAD in Section 9.1. Then, several related 
research directions are discussed in Section 9.2. 
9.1 Summary of Contributions 
The major contribution of this thesis is an access control administration model with adjustable 
decentralization (called ACAD), to protect both data and metadata. ACAD is uniform: all types of 
data and metadata are protected with the same mechanism. Moreover, ACAD is administratively 
flexible: it is adjustable to set any degree of decentralization of administration for each object, it 
allows users to update all hierarchies, and it provides very rich mechanisms for delegation and 
revocation. Hence, ACAD covers the spectrum of access control administration from the autocratic 
end to the self-governed end; its mechanism of updating hierarchies is the same as the one for 
updating access control data; and, it holds the right to delegate a specific authorization and the right to 
revoke it independently of each other and independently of the authorization itself. It is important to 
notice that ACAD is unique in terms of these characteristics with respect to other noteworthy models, 
discussed in Chapter 8. Details of our contributions are as follows. 
ACAD is policy-neutral, and therefore independent from the conflict resolution component. As a 
part of this thesis, we have implemented a unified algorithm to support several conflict resolution 
strategies simultaneously in the presence of sophisticated data hierarchies, which can be used  as the 
conflict resolution component of any system. ACAD is fine-grained, and therefore flexible to define 
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authorizations on any level of objects and to administer authorizations and the right to delegate them 
independently. It is controlled by flexible creation time policies that allow a single system to be 
deployed in a wide range of application environments.  
Furthermore, ACAD supports a wide-ranging set of access control features and is supported by a 
formal semantics defined operationally by a relational model. Within this framework, we also 
introduce the self-governance property in the context of access control, and show how the model 
facilitates it. We have shown how ACAD can set up a conflict-free and decentralized access control 
administration model, called UMAC, in which all users are able to retain complete control over their 
own data while they are also able to delegate any subset of their rights to other users or user groups. 
We have also characterized a novel mechanism to constrain access control administration for each 
object type at object creation time, as a means of adjusting the degree of decentralization when the 
system is configured.  
Finally, we have compared ACAD and several other significant models, namely AFS, FARDMS, 
FAF, and Ponder, to highlight its important features as well as its expressivity in the space of access 
control administration models.  
9.2 Future Work 
There are several directions to extend this work. The details are as follow: 
– Define a metric to measure the decentralization degree. There is no formal technique to verify 
decentralized access control administration models in terms of “the degree of decentralization.” 
Decentralization may increase anarchy, and centralization may cause an administration bottleneck. 
In other words, decentralization, e.g. in information sharing systems, is a special type of 
optimization problem in which the degree of decentralization needs to be maximized while keeping 
the anarchy below a specific amount. Similarly, centralization, e.g. in governments, is an 
optimization problem in which the degree of centralization needs to be maximized while keeping 
the administration load below a specific level. Nevertheless, each optimization problem requires a 
well defined metric. It is important to develop such metrics from which both system buyers and 
system developers can benefit. 
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– Define a metric to measure the restrictedness degree. Conflict resolution policies together with 
propagation policies raise an interesting question: how restricted is the combined system overall? 
Intuitively, this question addresses the ratio of positive and negative authorizations in the effective 
access control matrix. We believe that developing such a metric to measure the degree of 
restrictedness of a system will result in two immediate profits: first, understanding if a given 
system is closer to closed policy systems or to open policy ones, which consequently has several 
advantages, including choosing the right data structure for efficient representation; second, we 
believe such metrics can help in verifying the data availability and safety properties of access 
control models. 
– Develop a data structure that is flexibly adjustable by the system to match the specific 
configuration of banks, subjects, and objects of ACAD present in a given enterprise. Designing 
corresponding efficient access control algorithms will be the major contribution of this direction.  
– Develop a more flexible delegation mechanism for ACAD. In the current work, grantors delegate 
their access privileges at their wish. However, there are applications in which grantors may 
delegate an obligation or a responsibility only if the potential grantee agrees too. Moreover, in the 
current work, a privilege can be delegated as soon as a grantor delegate it (1-delegation) whereas 
there are applications in which the privilege is granted if a minimum number of grantors, delegate 
it (k-delegation).  
– Develop bag semantics for ACAD. There are applications in which the collection of authorizations 
for a given subject should semantically be a bag rather than a set; in this case, the revocation 
mechanism must keep track of the path of delegated rights in order to properly cascade the 
operation.  
This thesis provide an adjustable access control administration model, which is distinguished from 
other noteworthy existing model in terms of comprehensiveness and expressivity (as justified in Table 
6, as well as Figures 37 and 38); yet, the formal proofs of security properties (such as safety, 
accountability, and protection against attacks) as well as practical directions to measure performance 
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